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TRADE POLICY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH:
A SKEPTIC'S GUIDE TO THE CROSS-NATIONAL EVIDENCE
"It isn't what we don't know that kills us.  It's what we know that ain't so."
-- Mark Twain
I.  Introduction
Do countries with lower barriers to international trade experience faster economic
progress?  Few questions have been more vigorously debated in the history of economic thought,
and none is more central to the vast literature on trade and development.
The prevailing view in policy circles in North America and Europe is that recent
economic history provides a conclusive answer in the affirmative.  Multilateral institutions such
as the World Bank, IMF, and the OECD regularly promulgate advice predicated on the belief
that openness generates predictable and positive consequences for growth.  A recent report by
the OECD (1998, 36) states: “More open and outward-oriented economies consistently
outperform countries with restrictive trade and [foreign] investment regimes.”  According to the
IMF (1997, 84): “Policies toward foreign trade are among the more important factors promoting
economic growth and convergence in developing countries."
1
This view is widespread in the economics profession as well.  Krueger (1998, 1513), for
example, judges that it is straightforward to demonstrate empirically the superior growth
performance of countries with "outer-oriented" trade strategies.
2  According to Stiglitz (1998a,
36), "[m]ost specifications of empirical growth regressions find that some indicator of external
openness--whether trade ratios or indices of price distortions or average tariff level--is strongly
associated with per-capita income growth."
3
Such statements notwithstanding, if there is an inverse relationship between trade barriers
and economic growth, it is not one that immediately stands out in the data.  See for example
Figures I.1 and I.2.  The figures display the (partial) associations over the 1975-1994 period
between the growth rate of per-capita GDP and two measures of trade restrictions.   The first is
an average tariff rate, calculated by dividing total import duties by the volume of imports.  The
                                               
1 The IMF quote cites research by Sachs and Warner and by Ben-David, which we shall review in this paper.
2 Krueger cites Sachs and Warner (1995).
3 Stiglitz here cites Sachs and Warner (1995) as well.  Elsewhere Stiglitz (1998b) writes: "there is by and large a
consensus among economists—based on a wealth of studies—that trade liberalization brings significant economic
gains" to contrast the apparent consensus on trade liberalization with the lack of consensus with regard to capital-
account liberalization.2
second is a coverage ratio for non-tariff barriers to trade.
4  The figures show the relationship
between these measures and growth after controlling for levels of initial income and secondary
education.  In both cases, the slope of the relationship is only slightly negative and nowhere near
statistical significance.  This finding is not atypical.  Simple measures of trade barriers tend not
to enter significantly in well-specified growth regressions, regardless of time periods, sub-
samples, or the conditioning variables employed.
Of course, neither of the two measures we used above is a perfect indicator of trade
restrictions.  Simple tariff averages underweight high tariff rates because the corresponding
import levels tend to be low.  Such averages are also poor proxies for overall trade restrictions
when tariff and non-tariff barriers are substitutes.  As for the non-tariff coverage ratios, they do
not do a good job of discriminating between barriers that are highly restrictive and barriers with
little effect.  And conceptual flaws aside, both indicators are clearly measured with some error
(due to smuggling, weaknesses in the underlying data, coding problems, etc.).
In part because of concerns related to data quality, the recent literature on openness and
growth has resorted to more creative empirical strategies.  These strategies include: (a)
constructing alternative indicators of openness (Dollar 1992; Sachs and Warner 1995); (b) testing
robustness by using a wide range of measures of openness, including subjective indicators
(Edwards 1992, 1998); and (c) comparing convergence experience among groups of liberalizing
and non-liberalizing countries (Ben-David 1993).  This recent round of empirical research is
generally credited for having yielded stronger and more convincing results on the beneficial
consequences of openness than the previous, largely case-based literature.  Indeed, the
cumulative evidence that has emerged from such studies provides the foundation for the
previously-noted consensus on the growth-promoting effects of trade openness.
Our goal in this paper is to scrutinize this new generation of research.  We do so by
focussing on what the existing literature has to say on the following question: Do countries with
lower policy-induced barriers to international trade grow faster, once other relevant country
characteristics are controlled for? We take this to be the central question of policy relevance in
this area.  To the extent that the empirical literature demonstrates a positive causal link from
openness to growth, the main operational implication is that governments should dismantle their
barriers to trade.  Therefore, it is critical to ask how well the evidence supports the presumption
that doing so would raise growth rates.
Note that this question differs from an alternative one we could have asked: Does
international trade raise growth rates of income? This is a related, but conceptually distinct
question.  Trade policies do affect the volume of trade, of course.  But there is no strong reason
to expect their effect on growth to be quantitatively (or even qualitatively) similar to the
consequences of changes in trade volumes that arise from, say, reductions in transport costs or
increases in world demand.  To the extent that trade restrictions represent policy responses to real
or perceived market imperfections or, at the other extreme, are mechanisms for rent-extraction,
they will work differently from natural or geographical barriers to trade and other exogenous
                                               
4 Data for the first measure come from the World Bank's World Development Indicators 1998.  The second is taken
from Barro and Lee (1994), and is based on UNCTAD compilations.3
determinants.  Frankel and Romer (1998) recognize this point in their recent paper on the
relationship between trade volumes and income levels.  These authors use the geographical
component of trade volumes as an instrument to identify the effects of trade on income levels.
They appropriately caution that their results cannot be directly applied to the effects of trade
policies.
From an operational standpoint, it is clear that the relevant question is the one having to
do with the consequences of trade policies rather than trade volumes.  Hence we focus on the
recent empirical literature that attempts to measure the effect of trade policies.  Our main finding
is that this literature is largely uninformative regarding the question we posed above.   There is a
significant gap between the message that the consumers of this literature have derived and the
"facts" that the literature has actually demonstrated.  The gap emerges from a number of factors.
In many cases, the indicators of "openness" used by researchers are problematic as measures of
trade barriers or are highly correlated with other sources of poor economic performance.  In other
cases, the empirical strategies used to ascertain the link between trade policy and growth have
serious shortcomings, the removal of which results in significantly weaker findings.
The literature on openness and growth through the late 1980s was usefully surveyed in a
paper by Edwards (1993).  This survey covered detailed multi-country analyses (such as Little et
al. 1970 and Balassa 1971) as well as cross-country econometric studies (such as Feder 1983,
Balassa 1985, and Esfahani 1991).  Most of the cross-national econometric research that was
available up to that point focussed on the relationship between exports and growth, and not on
trade policy and growth.  Edwards' evaluation of this literature was largely negative (1993,
1389):
[M]uch of the cross-country regression based studies have been plagued by empirical and
conceptual shortcomings.  The theoretical frameworks used have been increasingly
simplistic, failing to address important questions such as the exact mechanism through
which export expansion affects GDP growth, and ignoring potential determinants of
growth such as educational attainment. Also, many papers have been characterized by a
lack of care in dealing with issues related to endogeneity and measurement errors.  All of
this has resulted, in many cases, in unconvincing results whose fragility has been exposed
by subsequent work.
Edwards argued that such weaknesses had reduced the policy impact of the cross-national
econometric research covered in his review.
Our paper picks up where Edwards' survey left off.  We focus on a number of empirical
papers that either were not included in or have appeared since that survey.  Judging by the
number of citations in publications by governmental and multilateral institutions, this recent
round of empirical research has been considerably more influential in policy circles.  Our
detailed analysis covers the four papers that are probably the best known in the field: Dollar
(1992), Sachs and Warner (1995), Ben-David (1993), and Edwards (1998).
A few words about the selection of papers.  The paper by Dollar (1992) was not reviewed
in Edwards' survey, perhaps because it had only recently been published.  We include it here
since it is, by our count, the most heavily cited empirical paper on the link between openness and4
growth.  Sachs and Warner (1995) is a close second, and the index of "openness" constructed
therein has now been widely used in the cross-national research on growth.
5  The other two
papers are also well known, but in these cases our decision was based less on citation counts than
on the fact that they are representative of different types of methodologies.  Ben-David (1993)
considers income convergence in countries that have integrated with each other (such as the
European Community countries).  Edwards (1998) undertakes a robustness analysis using a wide
range of trade-policy indicators, including some subjective indicators.  Some of the other recent
studies on the relationship between trade policy and growth will be discussed in the penultimate
section of the paper.
Our bottom line is that the nature of the relationship between trade policy and economic
growth remains very much an open question.  The issue is far from having been settled on
empirical grounds.  We are in fact skeptical that there is a general, unambiguous relationship
between trade openness and growth waiting to be discovered.  We suspect that the relationship is
a contingent one, dependent on a host of country and external characteristics.  Research aimed at
ascertaining the circumstances under which open trade policies are conducive to growth (as well
as those under which they may not be) and at scrutinizing the channels through which trade
policies influence economic performance is likely to prove more productive.
Finally, it is worth reminding the reader that growth and welfare are not the same thing.
Trade policies can have positive effects on welfare without affecting the rate of economic
growth.  Conversely, even if policies that restrict international trade were to reduce economic
growth, it does not follow that they would necessarily reduce the level of welfare.  Negative
coefficients on policy variables in growth regressions are commonly interpreted as indicating
that the policies in question are normatively undesirable.  Strictly speaking, such inferences are
invalid.
6  Our paper centers on the relationship between trade policy and growth because this is
the issue that has received the most attention in the existing literature.  We caution the reader that
the welfare implications of empirical results regarding this link (be they positive or negative)
must be treated with caution.
The outline of this paper is as follows.  We begin with a conceptual overview of the
issues relating to openness and growth.  We then turn to an in-depth examination of each of the
four papers mentioned previously (Dollar 1992; Sachs and Warner 1995; Edwards 1998; and
Ben-David 1993).  The penultimate section discusses briefly three other papers (Lee 1993;
Harrison 1996; and Wacziarg 1998).  We offer some final thoughts in the concluding section.
                                               
5 From its date of publication, Dollar’s paper has been cited at least 80 times, according to the Social Science
Citations Index.  Sachs and Warner (1995) is a close second, with 76 citations.  Edwards (1992), Ben-David (1993)
and Lee (1993) round off the list, with 53, 25 and 16 citations respectively.
6 Some of the main problems with economic growth as a measure of welfare are that: (i) the empirically identifiable
effect of policies on rates of growth--especially over short intervals--could be different from their effect on levels of
income; (ii) levels of per capita income may not be good indicators of welfare because they do not capture the
distribution of income or the level of access to primary goods and basic capabilities; and (iii) high growth rates
could be associated with suboptimally low levels of present day consumption.  Hall and Jones (1999) come closest
to addressing the first of these problems by studying the effect of openness on output per worker.  We shall criticize
their measure of openness--the Sachs-Warner openness dummy—in section IV below.5
II.  Conceptual issues
Think of a small economy that takes world prices of tradable goods as given.  What is the
relationship between trade restrictions and real GDP in such an economy?  The modern theory of
trade policy as it applies to such a country can be summarized in the following three
propositions:
1. In static models with no market imperfections and other pre-existing distortions, the
effect of a trade restriction is to reduce the level of real GDP at world prices.  In the
presence of market failures such as externalities, trade restrictions may increase real GDP
(although they are hardly ever the first-best means of doing so).
2. In standard models with exogenous technological change and diminishing returns to
reproducible factors of production (e.g., the neo-classical model of growth), a trade
restriction has no effect on the long-run (steady-state) rate of growth of output.
7  This is
true regardless of the existence of market imperfections.  However, there may be growth
effects during the transition to the steady state.  (These transitional effects could be
positive or negative depending on how the long-run level of output is affected by the
trade restriction.)
3. In models of endogenous growth generated by non-diminishing returns to reproducible
factors of production or by learning-by-doing and other forms of endogenous
technological change, the presumption is that lower trade restrictions boost output growth
in the world economy as a whole.  But a subset of countries may experience diminished
growth depending on their initial factor endowments and levels of technological
development.
Taken together, these points imply that there should be no theoretical presumption in
favor of finding an unambiguous, negative relationship between trade barriers and growth rates
in the types of cross-national data sets typically analyzed.
8  The main complications are twofold.
First, in the presence of certain market failures, such as positive production externalities in
import-competing sectors, the long-run levels of GDP (measured at world prices) can be higher
with trade restrictions than without.  In such cases, data sets covering relatively short time spans
will reveal a positive (partial) association between trade restrictions and the growth of output
along the path of convergence to the new steady state.  Second, under conditions of endogenous
growth, trade restrictions may also be associated with higher growth rates of output whenever the
restrictions promote technologically more dynamic sectors over others.  In dynamic models,
moreover, an increase in the growth rate of output is neither a necessary nor a sufficient
condition for an improvement in welfare.
                                               
7 Strictly speaking, this statement is true only when the marginal product of the reproducible factors ("capital") tends
to zero in the limit.  If this marginal product is bounded below by a sufficiently large positive constant, trade policies
can have an effect on long-run growth rates, similar to their effect in the more recent endogenous growth models
(point 3 below).  See the discussion in Srinivasan (1997).
8 See Buffie (1998) for an extensive theoretical discussion of the issues from the perspective of developing
countries.6
Since endogenous growth models are often thought to have provided the missing
theoretical link between trade openness and long-run growth, it is useful to spend a moment on
why such models in fact provide an ambiguous answer.  As emphasized by Grossman and
Helpman (1991), the general answer to the question "does trade promote innovation in a small
open economy" is: "it depends."
9  In particular, the answer varies depending on whether the
forces of comparative advantage push the economy's resources in the direction of activities that
generate long-run growth (via externalities in research and development, expanding product
variety, upgrading product quality, and so on) or divert them from such activities.  Grossman and
Helpman (1991), Feenstra (1990), Matsuyama (1992), and others have worked out examples
where a country that is behind in technological development can be driven by trade to specialize
in traditional goods and experience a reduction in its long-run rate of growth.  Such models are in
fact formalizations of some very old arguments about infant industries and about the need for
temporary protection to catch up with more advanced countries.
The issues can be clarified with the help of a simple model of a small open economy with
learning-by-doing.  The model is a simplified version of that in Matsuyama (1992), except that
we analyze the growth implications of varying the import tariff, rather than simply comparing
free trade to autarky.  The economy is assumed to have two sectors, agriculture (a) and
manufacturing (m), with the latter subject to learning-by doing that is external to individual firms
in the sector but internal to manufacturing as a whole.  Let labor be the only mobile factor
between the two sectors, and normalize the economy's labor endowment to unity.  We can then
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where nt stands for the labor force in manufacturing, a is the share of labor in value added in the
two sectors (assumed to be identical for simplicity), and t is a time subscript.  The productivity
coefficient in manufacturing Mt is a state variable evolving according to:
m
t t X M d =
.
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where an overdot represents a time derivative and d  captures the strength of the learning effect.
We assume the economy has an initial comparative disadvantage in manufacturing, and
normalize the relative price of manufactures on world markets to unity.  If the ad-valorem import
tariff on manufactures is t, the domestic relative price of manufactured goods becomes (1+t).
Instantaneous equilibrium in the labor market requires the equality of value marginal products of
labor in the two sectors:
1 1 ) 1 ( ) 1 (
- - + = -
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It can be checked that an increase in the import tariff has the effect of allocating more of the




                                               
9 This is a slight paraphrase of Grossman and Helpman (1991, 152).7














where a "^" denotes proportional changes.  
Let Yt denote the value of output in the economy evaluated at world prices:
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where lt  is the share of manufacturing output in total output when both are expressed at world
prices (i.e., lt  =  t
m
t Y X / ).  
Consider first the case when t = 0.  In this case, it can be checked that lt = nt and the
expression for the instantaneous growth rate of output simplifies to 
a dl t t t n Y = ˆ , which is strictly
positive whenever nt > 0.  Growth arises from the dynamic effects of learning, and is faster the
larger the manufacturing base nt.  A small tariff would have a positive effect on growth on
account of this channel because it would enlarge the manufacturing sector (raise nt).
When t > 0, the manufacturing share of output at world prices is less than the labor share
in manufacturing, and lt < nt.  Now the second term in the expression for  t Y ˆ  is negative.  The
intuition is as follows.  The tariff imposes a production-side distortion in the allocation of the
economy's resources.  For any given gap between lt and nt, the productive efficiency cost of this
distortion rises as manufacturing output (the base of the distortion) gets larger.
Hence the tariff exerts two contradictory effects on growth.  By pulling resources into the
manufacturing sector, it enlarges the scope for dynamic scale benefits, thereby increasing
growth.  But it also imposes a static efficiency loss, the cost of which rises over time as the
manufacturing sector becomes larger.
10  Figure II.1 shows the relationship between the tariff and
the rate of growth of output (at world prices) for a particular parameterization of this model.
Two curves are shown, one for the instantaneous rate of growth (based on the expression above),
and the other for the average growth rate over a twenty-year horizon (calculated as [1/20]x[lnY20
- lnY0]).  In both cases, growth increases in t until a critical level, and then diminishes in t.  This
pattern is, however, by no means general, and other types of results can be obtained under
different parameterizations.
The model clarifies a number of issues.  First, it shows that it is relatively straightforward
to write a well-specified model that generates the conclusions that many opponents of trade
                                               
10 We emphasize once again that these results on the growth of output do not translate directly into welfare
consequences.  In this particular model, the level effect of a tariff distortion also has to be taken into account before
a judgement on welfare can be passed.  Hence it is possible for welfare to be reduced (raised) even though the
growth rate of output is (permanently) higher (lower).8
openness have espoused--namely that free trade can be detrimental to some countries' economic
prospects, especially when these countries are lagging in technological development and have an
initial comparative advantage in "non-dynamic" sectors.  More broadly, the model illustrates that
there is no determinate theoretical link between trade protection and growth once real-world
phenomena such as learning, technological change, and market imperfections (here captured by a
learning-by-doing externality) are taken into account.  Third, it highlights the exact sense in
which trade restrictions distort market outcomes.  A trade barrier has resource-allocation effects
because it alters a domestic price ratio: it raises the domestic price of import-competing activities
relative to the domestic price of exportables, and hence introduces a wedge between the domestic
relative-price ratio and the opportunity costs reflected in relative border prices.
11  While this
point is obvious, it bears repeating as some of the empirical work reviewed below interprets
openness in a very different manner.
III.  David Dollar (1992)
As mentioned previously, the paper by Dollar (1992) is one of the most heavily cited
recent studies on the relationship between openness and growth.  The principal contribution of
Dollar's paper lies in the construction of two separate indices, which Dollar demonstrates are
each negatively correlated with growth over the 1976-85 period in a sample of 95 developing
countries.  The two indices are an "index of real exchange rate distortion" and an "index of real
exchange rate variability" (henceforth DISTORTION and VARIABILITY).  These indices relate
to "outward orientation," as understood by Dollar (1992, 524), in the following way:
Outward orientation generally means a combination of two factors: first, the level of
protection, especially for inputs into the production process, is relatively low (resulting in
a sustainable level of the real exchange rate that is favorable to exporters); and second,
there is relatively little variability in the real exchange rate, so that incentives are
consistent over time.
The indices DISTORTION and VARIABILITY are meant to capture these two dimensions of
"outward orientation."
In order to implement his approach, Dollar uses data from Summers and Heston (1988,
Mark 4.0) on comparative price levels.  The Summers-Heston work compares prices of an
identical basket of consumption goods across countries.  Hence, letting the U.S. be the
benchmark country, these data provide estimates of each country i's price level (RPLi) relative to
the U.S.:  ) /( 100 US i i i P e P RPL · = , where Pi and PUS are the respective consumption price indices,
and ei is the nominal exchange rate of country i against the U.S. dollar (in units of home currency
per dollar).
12  Since Dollar is interested in the prices of tradable goods only, he attempts to purge
the effect of systematic differences arising from the presence of non-tradables.  To do this, he
                                               
11 Some authors have stressed the effects that the high levels of discretion associated with trade policies can have on
rent-seeking and thus on economic performance (Krueger, 1974; Bhagwati, 1982).  These effects go beyond the
direct impact on resource allocation that we discuss.  They are however related more directly to the discretionary
nature of policies than to their effect on the economy’s openness.  Discretionary export promotion policies--which
will make an economy more open--should in principle be just as conducive to rent-seeking as protectionist policies.
12 Our notation differs from Dollar's (1992).  In particular, the exchange rate is defined differently.9
regresses RPLi on the level and square of GDP per capita and on regional dummies for Latin
America and Africa, as well as year dummies.  Let the predicted value from this regression be
denoted  i L P R ˆ .  Dollar's index of DISTORTION is  i i L P R RPL ˆ / , averaged over the ten-year
period 1976-1985.  VARIABILITY is in turn calculated by taking the coefficient of variation of
the annual observations of  i i L P R RPL ˆ / for each country over the same period.
Dollar interprets the variation in the values of DISTORTION across countries as
capturing cross-national differences in the restrictiveness of trade policy.  He states: “the index
derived here measures the extent to which the real exchange rate is distorted away from its free-
trade level by the trade regime” (Dollar 1992, 524).  Later on, referring to RPLi, he writes:
if there were no non-tradables, cross-country variation in these price levels could be taken
directly as a measure of inward or outward orientation caused by trade policy.  For
instance, a country sustaining a high price level over many years would clearly have to be
a country with a relatively large amount of protection (inward orientation).
Since this type of claim is often made in other work as well,
13 we shall spend some time on it
before reviewing Dollar’s empirical results.  We will show that a comparison of price indices for
tradables is informative about levels of trade protection only under very restrictive conditions
that are unlikely to hold in practice.  We will also show that the empirical relationship between
DISTORTION and growth identified by Dollar (1992) is not robust to the inclusion of standard
control variables, the use of updated Summers-Heston data, or to changes in the time period
analyzed.
Trade policies and price levels
We will not discuss further Dollar’s method for purging the component of non-tradable
goods prices that is systematically related to income and other characteristics.
14  Assuming the
method is successful, the DISTORTION measure approximates (up to a random error term) the
price of a country’s tradables relative to the U.S.  Letting P
T stand for the price index for
tradables and neglecting the error, the DISTORTION index for country i can then be expressed
as  P e P i
T
i US
T / ( ) .
Let us, without loss of generality, fix the price level of tradables in the U.S.,  P US
T , and
assume that free trade prevails in the U.S.  The question is under what conditions will trade
restrictions be associated with higher levels of  P e P i
T
i US
T / ( ) .  Obviously, the answer depends on
the effect of the restrictions on P i
T  (and possibly on ei).
                                               
13 E.g., in Bhalla and Lau (1992), whose index is also used in Harrison (1996).  We will discuss Harrison's paper in
the penultimate section.
14 For a good recent discussion of the problems that may arise on this account see Falvey and Gemmell (1999).10
Note that  P i
T  is an aggregate price index derived from the domestic prices of two types
of tradables, import-competing goods and exportables.  Hence  P i
T  can be expressed as a linearly
homogenous function of the form:
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where  pi
m and  pi
x are the domestic prices of import-competing goods and exportables,
respectively.  Since Summers-Heston price levels are estimated for an identical basket of goods,
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where we have made use of the linear homogeneity of p(.).  Note that the nominal exchange rate
has dropped out thanks to the assumption of the law of one price.
Consider first the case where there are binding import restrictions, but no export
restrictions (ti
m > 0 and ti
x= 0).  In this instance, it is apparent that 
T
i P  > 
T
US iP e , and trade
restrictions do indeed raise the domestic price of tradables (relative to the benchmark country).
Judging from the quotations above, this is the case that Dollar seems to have in mind.
On the other hand, consider what happens when the country in question rescinds all
import restrictions and imposes instead export restrictions at an ad-valorem level that equals that
of the import restrictions just lifted (ti
m = 0 and ti
x> 0).  From the Lerner (1936) symmetry
theorem, it is evident that the switch from import protection to export taxation has no resource-
allocation and distributional effects for the economy whatsoever. The relative price between
tradables,  pi
m/ pi
x , remains unaffected by the switch.  Yet, because export restrictions reduce the
domestic price of exportables relative to world prices, it is now the case that 
T
i P  < 
T
US iP e .  The
country will now appear, by Dollar’s measure, to be outward oriented.
One practical implication is that economies that combine import barriers with export
taxes (such as many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa) will be judged less protected than those
that rely on import restrictions alone.  Conversely, countries that dilute the protective impact of
import restrictions by using export subsidies (ti
x< 0) will appear more protected than countries
that do not do so.
Hence the DISTORTION index is sensitive to the form in which trade restrictions are
applied.  This follows from the fact that trade policies work by altering relative prices within an
economy; they do not have unambiguous implications for the level of prices in a country relative11
to another.  A necessary condition for Dollar's index to do a good job of ranking trade regimes
according to restrictiveness is that export policies (whether they tax or promote exports) play a
comparatively minor role.  Moreover, as we show in the next section, this is not a sufficient
condition.
How relevant is the law of one price in practice?
The discussion above was framed in terms that are the most favorable to Dollar’s
measure, in that we assumed the law of one price (LOP) holds.  Under this maintained
hypothesis, the prices of tradable goods produced in different countries can diverge from each
other, when expressed in a common currency, only when there exist trade restrictions (or
transport costs).
However, there is a vast array of evidence suggesting that LOP does not accurately
describe the world we live in.  In a recent review article, Rogoff (1996, 648) writes of the
"startling empirical failure of the law of one price."  Rogoff concludes: "commodities where the
deviations from the law of one price damp out very quickly are the exception rather than the
rule" (Rogoff 1996, 650).  Further, the evidence suggests that deviations from LOP are
systematically related to movements in nominal exchange rates (see references in Rogoff 1996).
Indeed, it is well known that (nominal) exchange-rate policies in many developing countries are
responsible for producing large and sustained swings in real exchange rates.  Trade barriers or
transport costs typically play a much smaller role.
Dollar (1992, 525) acknowledges that "there might be short-term fluctuations [unrelated
to trade barriers] if purchasing-power parity did not hold continuously," but considers that these
fluctuations would average out over time.  Rogoff (1996, 647) concludes in his survey that the
speed of convergence to purchasing-power parity (PPP) is extremely slow, of the order of
roughly 15 percent per year.  At this speed of convergence, averages constructed over a time
horizon of 10 years (the horizon used in Dollar's paper) would exhibit substantial divergence
from PPP in the presence of nominal shocks.
Under this interpretation, a significant portion of the cross-national variation in price
levels exhibited in DISTORTION would be due not to trade policies, but to monetary and
exchange-rate policies.  Unlike trade policies, nominal exchange-rate movements have an
unambiguous effect on the domestic price level of traded goods relative to foreign prices when
LOP fails: an appreciation raises the price of both import-competing and exportable goods
relative to foreign prices, and a depreciation has the reverse effect.  Countries where the nominal
exchange rate was not allowed to depreciate in line with domestic inflation would exhibit an
appreciation of the real exchange rate (a rise in domestic prices relative to foreign levels), and
correspondingly would be rated high on the DISTORTION index.  Countries with aggressive
policies of devaluation (or low inflation relative to the trend depreciation of their nominal
exchange rate) would receive low DISTORTION ratings.
Transport costs provide another reason why DISTORTION may be unrelated to trade
policies, especially in a large cross-section of countries.  Dollar’s index would be influenced by
geographic variables such as access to sea routes and distance to world markets, even when the12
LOP—appropriately modified to account for transport costs—holds.  Hence in practice
DISTORTION is likely to capture the effects of geography as well as of exchange-rate policies.
Indeed, when we regress Dollar’s DISTORTION index on the black market premium (a measure
of exchange rate policy), a set of continent dummies, and two trade-related geographic variables
(the coastal length over total land area and a dummy for tropical countries), we find that these
explain 52 percent of the variation in Dollar’s distortion index (Table III.1, column 1).  Not only
is the additional effect of two trade policy variables (tariffs and quotas) minor in comparison
(column 2), but these enter with the wrong sign!  Higher levels of tariffs and quotas seem to
induce, if anything, lower levels of price distortions according to Dollar’s index, after relevant
geographic characteristics and exchange rate policy variables are controlled for.
To summarize, DISTORTION is theoretically appropriate as a measure of trade
restrictions when three conditions hold: (a) there are no export taxes or subsidies in use; (b) the
law of one price holds continuously; and (c) there are no systematic differences in national price
levels due to transport costs and other geographic factors.  Obviously, all of these requirements
are counterfactual.  Whether one believes that DISTORTION still provides useful empirical
information on trade regimes depends on one's priors regarding the practical significance of the
three limitations expressed above.
15  Our view is that the second and third of these--the departure
from LOP and the effect of geography--are particularly important in practice.  We regard it as
likely that it is the variance in nominal exchange-rate policies and geography, and not the
variance in trade restrictions, that drives the cross-sectional variance of DISTORTION.
Why variability?
As mentioned previously, Dollar (1992) uses his measure of DISTORTION in
conjunction with a measure of VARIABILITY, the latter being the coefficient of variation of
DISTORTION measured on an annual basis.  He is driven to do this because the country
rankings using DISTORTION produce some "anomalies."  For example, "Korea and Taiwan
have the highest distortion measures of the Asian developing economies" and "the rankings
within the developed country groups are not very plausible" (Dollar 1992, 530-531).  The ten
least distorted countries by this measure include not only Hong Kong, Thailand, Malta, but also
Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Mexico, South Africa, Nepal, Pakistan and Syria!  Burma's rating (90)
equals that of the United States.  Taiwan (116) is judged more distorted than Argentina (113).
Our discussion above indicated that DISTORTION is highly sensitive to the form in which trade
policies are applied and to exchange-rate policies as well as omitted geographic characteristics.
So such results are not entirely surprising.
Dollar states that the "number of anomalies declines substantially if the real exchange
rate distortion measure is combined with real exchange rate variability to produce an outward
orientation index" (Dollar 1992, 531).  He thus produces a country ranking based on a weighted
average of the DISTORTION and VARIABILITY indices.  Since these two indices are entered
                                               
15 The sensitivity of Dollar’s index to these assumptions highlights a generic difficulty with regression-based indices
which use the residual from a regression to proxy for an excluded variable: such indices capture variations in the
excluded variable accurately only as long as the model is correctly and fully specified.  If some variables are
excluded from the estimated equation, they will form part of the index.13
separately in his growth regressions, we shall not discuss this combined index of "outward
orientation" further.
However, we do wish to emphasize the obvious point that the VARIABILITY index has
little to do with trade restrictions, as commonly understood, or with inward- or outward-
orientation per se.  Remember that DISTORTION is the (adjusted) price level of tradables
relative to a foreign benchmark.  Consider what happens when this relative price fluctuates
because of movements in the domestic price of tradables.  Suppose first that the prices of non-
tradables move in synch with the price of tradables.  In this case, VARIABILITY captures the
movement of the entire domestic price structure in relation to foreign prices, and whatever
"distortions" or "biases" are thereby created do not discriminate between tradables and non-
tradables (and much less among tradables).  Alternatively, suppose that the prices of tradables
fluctuate against non-tradables as well.  Now, domestic relative prices do exhibit instability, but
the effect of this on relative production and consumption incentives cannot be deduced a priori.
Since the tradable and non-tradable sectors share a common relative price, one of these sectors
cannot experience greater price risk without the other doing the same.  The economy-wide risk
may result in lower investment overall, but there is no presumption that this makes the economy
more inward oriented.
What does VARIABILITY really measure?  The ten countries with the highest
VARIABILITY scores are Iraq, Uganda, Bolivia, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Guyana, Somalia,
Nigeria, Ghana, and Guatemala.  For the most part, these are countries that have experienced
very high inflation rates and/or severe political disturbances during the 1976-85 period.  It is
plausible that VARIABILITY measures economic instability at large.  In any case, it is unclear
to us why we should think of it as an indicator of trade orientation.
Empirical results
We check the robustness of Dollar's (1992) empirical results by extending them in two
directions.  First, we rerun his regressions in a more conventional form, following standard
practice in recent cross-national work on growth.  Second, we redo his calculations for the
DISTORTION and VARIABILITY indices using more recent Summers-Heston Mark 5.6 data to
see whether his regression results hold with the revised data.
The first column of Table III.2 shows our replication of the core Dollar (1992) result for
95 developing countries.  Dollar's benchmark specification includes on the right-hand side the
investment rate (as a share of GDP, averaged over 1976-85) in addition to DISTORTION and
VARIABILITY. As shown in column (1), DISTORTION and VARIABILITY both enter with
negative and highly significant coefficients using this specification.  (Our results are virtually
identical to those in Dollar (1992), with the difference that our t-statistics are based on
heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors.)
None of Dollar's runs include standard regressors such as initial income, education, and
regional dummies.  The other columns of Table III.2 show the results as we alter Dollar's
specification to make it more compatible with recent cross-national work on growth (e.g., Barro
1997).  First, we add regional dummies for Latin America, East Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa to14
ensure that the results are not due to omitted factors correlated with geographical location
(column 2).  Next we drop the investment rate (column 3), and add in succession initial income
(column 4) and initial schooling (column 5).
16  The dummies for Latin America and Sub-Saharan
Africa are negative and statistically significant.  Initial income and education also enter
significantly, with the expected signs (negative and positive, respectively).
We find that the VARIABILITY index is robust to these changes, but that DISTORTION
is not.  In fact, as soon as we introduce regional dummies in the regression, the estimated
coefficient on DISTORTION comes down sizably and becomes insignificant.  Whatever
DISTORTION may be measuring, this raises the possibility that the results with this index are
spurious, arising from the index's correlation with (omitted) regional effects.
17
Dollar's original results were based on data from Mark 4.0 of the Summers-Heston
database (Summers and Heston 1988).  In Table III.3, we carry out a similar exercise using the
more recent version (Mark 5.6) of the Summers-Heston data.  We have re-calculated Dollar's
DISTORTION and VARIABILITY indices using the revised data, but have confined ourselves
to the same period examined by Dollar (1976-85). The revised data allow us to generate these
indices for 112 developing countries.  We show results with Dollar's original sample of 95
countries also.
The correlation between the revised and original DISTORTION measures, although
positive, is only moderately high (0.56).
18  The correlation between the two VARIABILITY
indices is higher (0.71).  One consequence is that the benchmark Dollar specification now has a
much poorer fit (an R
2 of 0.16 versus 0.38 in the original version).  Moreover, the estimated
coefficient on DISTORTION is positive, small, and statistically insignificant, even without the
addition of regional dummies (Table III.3, column 1).  Two countries, Ghana and Uganda, have
much higher values for DISTORTION in the revised data than in the original.  Including a
dummy for these two countries renders the estimated coefficient on DISTORTION negative and
statistically significant at the 90 percent level (column 2).  With the inclusion of regional
dummies, DISTORTION turns insignificant once again (columns 3 and 4).  The results with the
original 95-country sample are similar (columns 5-8), except that DISTORTION is now
statistically significant (at the 90 percent level) when all the controls--including, most critically,
                                               
16 The income variable comes from the Summers-Heston (Mark 4.0) data set used in Dollar (1992).  Schooling is
from Barro and Lee (1994).
17 An alternative interpretation is that there is insufficient intra-regional variation in trade policy to distinguish its
effect on growth from that of omitted regional effects. Note, however, that in columns 2-5 DISTORTION is
insignificant while the Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa dummies have statistically significant coefficients.
Thus the effect of the regional dummies appears to be stronger than that of the trade policy indicators, shedding
doubt on the interpretation that they are picking up only trade policy effects.
18 This correlation is in great part influenced by two large outliers, Ghana and Uganda, which have much higher
price levels in the more recent data.  If one takes these two outliers out, the correlation between the two indices is
.6815
the dummy for Ghana and Uganda--are introduced (column 8).
19  The estimated coefficient on
VARIABILITY is negative and statistically significant throughout.
We have carried out a number of similar exercises for cross-sections over different
periods, as well as panel regressions with fixed effects.
20  We don't report those results here for
reasons of space.  However, the bottom line that emerges is in line with the regressions just
discussed: the estimated coefficient on VARIABILITY is generally robust to alterations in
specifications; the coefficient on DISTORTION is not.
IV.  Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warner (1995)
We turn next to the paper “Economic Reform and the Process of Global Integration” by
Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warner (1995).  This extremely influential paper
21 is an ambitious
attempt to solve the measurement error problem in the literature by constructing an index of
openness that combines information about several aspects of trade policy. The Sachs-Warner
(SW) openness indicator (OPEN) is a zero-one dummy, which takes the value 0 if the economy
was closed according to any one of the following criteria:
1. it had average tariff rates higher than 40% (TAR);
2. its nontariff barriers covered on average more than 40% of imports (NTB);
3. it had a socialist economic system (SOC);
4. it had a state monopoly of major exports (MON);
5. its black market premium exceeded 20% during either the decade of the 1970s or the
decade of the 1980s  (BMP).
 22
The rationale for combining these indicators into a single dichotomous variable is that
they represent different ways in which policymakers can close their economy to international
trade.  Tariffs set at 50 percent have exactly the same resource-allocation implications as quotas
at a level that raised domestic market prices for importables by 50 percent.  To gauge the effect
of openness on growth, it is necessary to use a variable that classifies as closed those countries
                                               
19 This significance is in great part driven by Zaire.  When an additional dummy for Zaire is introduced into equation
8, the t-statistic on the distortion variable drops to 1.11.
20  In four replications of Dollar’s baseline specification for different decades we were able to find a negative effect
of DISTORTION on growth only for the 1976-85 subperiod.  Fixed effects and random effects panel estimates (with
five or ten year averages as time periods) reveal no significant negative effect of DISTORTION on growth after a
set of standard cross-country regressors are added. VARIABILITY has a negative and significant coefficient in all
regressions except for the 1960-69 subperiod.
21 A partial listing of papers that have made use of the Sachs-Warner index includes Hall and Jones (1998),
Wacziarg (1998), Sala-i-Martin (1997), Burnside and Dollar (1997), and Collins and Bosworth (1996).
22 Sachs and Warner use data from the following sources: Lee (1993) for non-tariff barriers, Barro and Lee (1993)
for tariffs, World Bank (1994) for state monopoly of exports, Kornai (1992) for the classification of socialist and
non-socialist countries, and International Currency Analysis (various years) for black market premia. There are 6
economies which Sachs and Warner rate as open or closed relying on information not contained in any of these data
sets. These are Morocco, South Africa, Haiti, Luxembourg, Australia and New Zealand.  For those economies, they
either make a general assessment of their trade policies or rely on information from other reports on the level of
protection.  The results in this paper hold irrespective of how one classifies these six economies.16
that were able to effectively restrict their economies' integration into world markets through the
use of different combinations of policies that would achieve that result.  Furthermore, if these
openness indicators are correlated among themselves, introducing them separately in a regression
may not yield reliable estimates due to their possibly high level of collinearity.
The Sachs-Warner dummy has a high and apparently robust coefficient when inserted in
growth regressions.  The point estimate of its effect on growth (in the original benchmark
specification) is 2.44 percentage points: economies that pass all five requirements experience on
average economic growth two and a half percentage points higher than those that do not.  The t-
statistic is 5.50 (5.83 if estimated using robust standard errors).  This coefficient appears to be
highly robust: in a recent paper which subjects 58 potential determinants of growth to an
exhaustive sensitivity analysis, the average p-value for the Sachs-Warner index is less than 0.1
percent.
23
In this section we ask several questions about the Sachs-Warner results.  First, we ask
which, if any, of the individual components of the index are responsible for the strength of the
Sachs-Warner dummy.  We find that the Sachs-Warner dummy’s strength derives mainly from
the combination of the black market premium (BMP) and the state monopoly of exports (MON)
variables.  Very little of the dummy's statistical power would be lost if it were constructed using
only these two indicators.  In particular, there is little action in the two variables that are the most
direct measures of trade policy: tariff and non-tariff barriers (TAR and NTB).
We then ask to what extent the black-market premium and state monopoly variables are
measures of trade policy.  We suggest that their significance in explaining growth can be traced
to their correlation with other determinants of growth: macroeconomic problems in the case of
the black-market premium, and location in Sub-Saharan Africa in the case of the state monopoly
variable.  We show that the Sachs-Warner indicator is not robust against alternative indicators
that combine measures of macroeconomic distress with location in Sub-Saharan Africa.  We
conclude that the Sachs-Warner indicator serves as a proxy for a wide range of policy and
institutional differences, and that it yields an upwardly-biased estimate of the effects of trade
restrictions proper.
Which individual variables account for the significance of the Sachs-Warner dummy?
In Table IV.1 we show the simple correlations between economic growth and the
components of the SW dummy during the 1970-89 period, the period analyzed by Sachs and
Warner (1995).  These correlations suggest that two of the underlying variables used to construct
the index are significantly associated with growth: whether the economy has a state monopoly of
its main exports (MON) and whether its black market premium exceeded 20% in the 1970s or
1980s (BMP).
24  In Table IV.2 we see that this result is confirmed when the variables are
                                               
23  Sala-i-Martin (1997).  The variable used by Sala-i-Martin is the number of years an economy was open according
to the Sachs-Warner criteria, whereas here we follow Sachs and Warner’s (1995) original article and use a dummy
which captures whether or not the economy was open during the 1970-89 time period.
24  The strength of the BMP variable is in part derived from its dichotomous nature.  The correlation of the black
market premium with growth is -0.29 for the 1970s and -0.26 for the 1980s.  See the next subsection for more
discussion of this point.17
inserted simultaneously in a growth regression.  We use the same controls used by Sachs and
Warner (1995), most of which are standard in the empirical growth literature.
25  The variables
BMP and MON are highly significant, whereas the rest are not (column 2). An F-test for the joint
significance of the other three components (SOC, TAR and NTB) yields a p-value of 0.25.
26
(Note that the number of observations is lower in the regression where the components are
entered individually because not all of the 79 countries in the original sample have data for each
of the five SW components.)
Another way to check whether BMP and MON drive the Sachs-Warner result is to ask
the following question: suppose that we had built a dummy variable, in the spirit of Sachs and
Warner, which classified an economy as closed only if it was closed according to BMP and
MON.  That is, suppose we ignored the information the other three variables give us as to the
economy’s openness.  How significant would the coefficient of our variable be in a growth
regression?  How different would the partition between open and closed economies that it
generates be from that generated by the SW dummy?  Suppose alternatively that we also
constructed an openness dummy based only on the information contained in SOC, NTB, and
TAR.  How significant would that variable be in a growth regression? And how correlated would
it be with openness?
Columns (3)-(6) of Table IV.2 address the question of significance.  We denote as BM a
variable that takes the value 1 when the economy is "open" according to criteria 4 and 5 above,
whereas SQT equals 1 when the economy passes criteria 1, 2 and 3. We substitute these variables
for the SW openness index in the regression Sachs and Warner present in their paper.  Entered on
its own, BM is highly significant, with an estimated coefficient that is very close to that on
OPEN (2.09 versus 2.44; see column 3).  When SQT is substituted for BM, the estimated
coefficient on SQT is much smaller (0.88) and significant only at the 90 percent level (column
4).  We next enter BM and SQT simultaneously: the coefficient of SQT now has a t-statistic of
1.59, whereas the coefficient on BM retains a t-statistic of 5.09 and a point estimate (2.12) close
to that on the openness variable in the original equation (column 5).  Once the investment rate
and investment prices, which are likely to be endogenous, are taken out of the equation, the t-
statistic on SQT drops to 1.30 and that on BM rises to 5.94 (column 6).
The comparability of the results in Table IV.2 is hampered by the fact that the sample
size changes as we move from one column to the next.  As noted above, this is because not all of
the 79 countries in the sample have data for each of the individual Sachs-Warner components.
To check whether this introduces any difficulties for our interpretation, we have also run these
regressions holding the sample size fixed.  We restricted the sample to those countries which
have the requisite data for all the components, using both the original specification (n=71) and a
specification where we drop two of the Sachs-Warner regressors with t-statistics below unity
                                                                                                                                                      
25 These are log of GDP in 1970, secondary schooling in 1970, primary schooling in 1970, government consumption
as a percent of GDP, number of revolutions and coups per year, number of assassinations per million population,
relative price of investment goods, and ratio of investment to GDP.
26   The result is not due to multicollinearity: the R
2s from regressions of either of SOC, NTB and TAR on the other
two are, respectively, 0.02, 0.05. and 0.05.18
(primary schooling and revolutions and coups) to gain additional observations (n=74).  In both
cases, our results were similar to those reported above: Regardless of whether BM and SQT are
entered separately or jointly, the coefficient on BM is highly significant (with a point estimate
that is statistically indistinguishable from that on OPEN) while the coefficient on SQT is
insignificant.
27
Hence, once BM is included, there is little additional predictive power coming from
regime type (socialist or not), level of tariffs, or coverage of non-tariff barriers.
28  The strength of
the Sachs-Warner index derives from the low growth performance of countries with either high
black market premia or state export monopolies (as classified by Sachs and Warner [1995]).
This point is underscored by Figures IV.1 and IV.2, which show the partial associations
between economic growth and these two alternative indicators of openness (based on column 5
of Table 2).  The partial association between BM and growth is quite strong, while that between
SQT and growth is weak.
29
The reason why BM performs so much better than SQT is that BM generates a partition
between closed and open economies that is much closer to that generated by OPEN than the
partition generated by SQT.  Only six economies are classified differently by BM when
compared to OPEN, while OPEN and SQT disagree in 31 cases.  The disagreement between
OPEN and SQT is concentrated in 15 African and 12 Latin American economies which SQT
fails to qualify as closed but BM (and therefore OPEN) does: the African economies are found to
                                               
27 The largest t-statistic we obtained for SQT in these runs is 1.4.  These results are not shown to save space, but are
available on request.
28 A different form in which the "horse race" can be run, suggested to us by Jeffrey Sachs, is to introduce OPEN and
BM together in the regression, to see if OPEN clearly "wins."  When we do this, we find that the point estimate of
the coefficient on OPEN is generally larger than that on BM, but that the two coefficients are statistically
indistinguishable from each other.  This is true regardless of whether we rely only on the raw data to classify
countries or use Sachs and Warner's qualitative evaluation for six economies.  The respective coefficients on OPEN
and BM are 1.31 (1.86) and 0.99 (1.78) when we use the raw data, and 1.64 (2.64) and 0.99 (1.79) when we use the
Sachs-Warner subjective evaluations (t-statistics in parentheses).  The two coefficients cannot be distinguished
statistically because OPEN and BM are highly collinear with each other (as we discuss further below).  On the other
hand, when OPEN and SQT are entered together, SQT has the wrong (negative) sign and the equality of coefficients
can be rejected easily.
29 This conclusion is true regardless of how we rate the countries in which Sachs and Warner’s classification did not
correspond to the values of the underlying data.  As noted in a previous footnote, there are 6 economies for which
Sachs and Warner rely on qualitative assessments and information from other reports instead of their primary data to
classify them as open or closed.  As it is not always clear what dimension of trade policy these general assessments
pertain to, the results in the text rate an economy as closed according to BM and SQT when it was rated as closed
according to this additional information.  If we base our classification only on the raw data and ignore these
supplementary assessments, the t-statistic on SQT goes down to 1.21.   The t-statistic on SQT can be made to
increase up to 2.01 if one classifies New Zealand as a closed economy in terms of quotas but not in terms of other
trade policies, as Sachs and Warner’s comments on New Zealand seem to imply.  This is still well below the t-
statistic on BM of 5.07.  Furthermore, the characterization of New Zealand as a closed economy on the basis of its
quotas is inconsistent with the definition of the NTB variable for other countries, which use data for 1985-88 (Lee,
1993), a time by which New Zealand’s Fourth Labor Government had already started an aggressive liberalization
program bringing quotas down below the threshold level of 40% (Laird and Yeats 1990, Table 4.2; Roper 1997).19
be closed because of their state monopolies of exports and those of Latin America because of
their high levels of black market premia. The average rate of growth of these economies is 0.24,
much lower than the sample average of 1.44.
Our result is not due to an arbitrary distinction between BM and SQT.  SQT performs
more poorly than any other openness index constructed on the basis of three of the five indicators
used by Sachs and Warner, and BM performs more strongly than any index constructed with two
of these five indicators (Table IV.3, upper panel).  A similar result applies to partitions along
other dimensions: those constructed using four indicators which exclude either BMP or MON do
more poorly than any of those which include them; and either BMP or MON individually do
better than any of the other indicators (Table IV.3, lower panel).
In view of the overwhelming contribution of the black market premium and the dummy
on state monopoly of exports to the statistical performance of the Sachs-Warner openness index,
we next ask what exactly these two variables measure.  To what extent are they indicators of
trade policy?  Could they be correlated with other variables that have a detrimental effect on
growth, therefore not giving us much useful information on trade openness per se?  We turn now
to these questions, first with an analysis of the state monopoly of exports variable, and then with
a discussion of the black market premium variable.
What does the State Monopoly of Exports variable represent?
Sachs and Warner’s rationale for using an indicator of the existence of a state monopoly
on major exports is the well-known equivalence between import and export taxes (Lerner 1936).
The MON variable is meant to capture cases in which governments taxed major exports and
therefore reduced the level of trade (exports and imports).  Sachs and Warner use an index of the
degree of distortions caused by export marketing boards, taken from the World Bank study
Adjustment in Africa: Reforms, Results, and the Road Ahead (World Bank 1994).
30
We note that the World Bank study covers only 29 African economies that were under
structural adjustment programs from 1987 to 1991.  This results in a double selection bias.  First,
non-African economies with restrictive policies towards exports automatically escape scrutiny.
Second, African economies with restrictive export policies but not undergoing adjustment
programs in the late 1980s are also overlooked.  Since Africa was the slowest growing region
during the period covered and economies that need to carry out structural adjustment programs
are likely to be doing worse than those that are not, the effect is to bias the coefficient on
openness upwards on both accounts.
How this selection bias affects the country classification can be illustrated by two
examples: Indonesia and Mauritius.  Both of these economies are rated as open in the Sachs-
Warner sample.  Both are excluded from the sample used to construct the state monopoly on
exports variable: Indonesia because it is not in Africa, and Mauritius because, due to its good
economic performance, it was not undergoing a World Bank adjustment program during the late
                                               
30 Sachs and Warner (1995) cite a different source in their paper, but World Bank (1994) appears to be the correct
source.20
1980s.  Yet both of these economies would seem to satisfy the conditions necessary to be rated
as closed according to the export monopoly criterion: Indonesian law restricts oil and gas
production to the state oil company, PERTAMINA, and Mauritius sells all of its export sugar
production through the Mauritius Sugar Syndicate.
31 Indonesia and Mauritius are also among the
ten fastest growing economies in the Sachs-Warner sample.
One of the problems that this selection bias causes in the Sachs-Warner estimation is that
it makes the MON variable virtually indistinguishable from a sub-Saharan Africa dummy.
32
There are 13 African countries (out of 47) in the Sachs-Warner study that are not rated as closed
according to MON. (Twelve of these were not included in World Bank study.)  But for all but
one of these observations MON adds no additional information, either because they are dropped
from the sample due to unavailability of other data or because they are rated as closed by other
trade policy indicators used to construct the index.  The result is that the only difference between
having used an export marketing board variable to construct the Sachs-Warner index and having
used a sub-Saharan Africa dummy is a single observation.  That observation is Mauritius, the
fastest growing African economy in the sample.
33
We conclude that the export marketing board variable, as implemented, is not a good
measure of trade policy and creates a serious bias in the estimation.  Except for Mauritius, whose
classification as open seems to us to be due exclusively to selection bias, the inclusion of MON
in the Sachs-Warner dummy is indistinguishable from the use of a Sub-Saharan Africa dummy.
In that respect, the only information that we can extract from it is that African economies have
grown more slowly than the rest of the world during the seventies and eighties.
What does the Black Market Premium variable measure?
The second source of strength in the Sachs-Warner openness variable is the black market
premium.  Indeed, the simple correlation between the openness dummy and BMP is 0.63.  A
simple regression of growth on the black market premium dummy and all the other controls
gives a coefficient of -1.05 with a t-statistic of nearly 2.5 in absolute value.  How good an
indicator of openness is the black market premium?
                                               
31 See Pertamina (1998) for Indonesia and Gulhati and Nahari (1990, 22) as well as World Bank (1989, 6) for
Mauritius.  Oil represented 61.2 % of Indonesian exports and sugar represented between 60-80% of Mauritius
exports during the period covered by the Sachs-Warner study (see World Bank 1983, Table E, and 1998).  Although
manufactures have recently outstripped sugar as Mauritius’s main export, this is a recent development: in 1980 sugar
represented 65% of Mauritius’s total exports and agriculture was surpassed by manufacturing as the main source of
exports only in 1986 (World Bank 1998).
32 This is true despite the fact that the Sachs-Warner dummy’s coefficient is still significant after the estimation is
carried out controlling for a Sub-Saharan Africa dummy.  The reason is that the SW dummy still has substantial
explanatory power left due to its use of the Black Market Premium variable.
33 Both Lesotho and Botswana had higher growth rates than Mauritius but Lesotho was not rated due to insufficient
data (Sachs and Warner 1995, 85) and Botswana is dropped from their sample because of unavailability of
government consumption data.21
The black market premium measures the extent of rationing in the market for foreign
currency.  The theoretical argument for using the black market premium in this context is that,
under certain conditions, foreign exchange restrictions act as a trade barrier.  Using our notation
from the previous section (but omitting country subscripts), the domestic price of import-
competing goods relative to exportables can be expressed as follows:
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where an asterisk refers to border prices.  We now allow for the possibility that the exchange
rates applicable to import and export transactions (e
m and e
x, respectively) can differ.  Foreign
currency rationing can drive a wedge between these two exchange rates.
Suppose the form that rationing takes is as follows: all imports are financed at the margin
by buying foreign currency in the black market, while all export receipts are handed to the
central bank at the official exchange rate.  In this case, e
m/e
x = (1+BMP), and the presence of a
black market premium works exactly like a trade restriction (by raising p
m/p
x).
34  On the other
hand, if at the margin exporters can sell their foreign-currency receipts on the black market as
well, then the wedge between e
m and e
x disappears.  In this case, the black-market premium does
not work like a trade restriction.
35
But there is a deeper problem with interpreting the black-market premium as an indicator
of trade policy.  Sachs and Warner rate an economy closed according to BMP if it maintains
black market premia in excess of 20 percent for a whole decade (the 1970s or the 1980s).  Such
levels of the black market premium are indicative of sustained macroeconomic imbalances.
Overvaluation of this magnitude is likely to emerge (i) when there is a deep inconsistency
between domestic aggregate demand policies and exchange rate policy, or (ii) when the
government tries to maintain a low level of the exchange rate in order to counteract transitory
confidence or balance of payments crises.  Such imbalances may be sparked by political
conflicts, external shocks, or sheer mismanagement, and would typically manifest themselves in
inflationary pressures, high and growing levels of external debt, and a stop-go pattern of policy-
making.  In addition, since black market premia tend to favor government officials who can trade
exchange rate allocations for bribes, we would expect them to be high wherever there are high
levels of corruption.  Therefore, countries with greater corruption, a less reliable bureaucracy,
and lower capacity for enforcement of the rule of law are also likely have higher black market
premia.
Hence it is reasonable to suppose that the existence of sizable black market premia over
long periods of time reflects a wide range of policy failures.  It is also reasonable to think that
these failures will be responsible for low growth.  What is more debatable, in our view, is the
attribution of the adverse growth consequences exclusively to the trade-restrictive effects of
black market premia.
                                               
34 The distributional effects can differ of course, as import tariffs are paid in to the treasury while scarcity rents in
the foreign-currency market can be appropriated by individuals.
35 In one respect, Sachs and Warner (1995) treat BMP differently from a trade restriction: the cutoff for tariffs
(TAR) is set at 40 percent while that for BMP is set at 20 percent.22
As shown in Table IV.4, many of the relationships just discussed are present in the data.
The simple correlations of black market premia with the level of inflation, the debt/exports ratio,
wars and institutional quality are all sufficiently high to warrant preoccupation.  Indeed, of the 48
economies ranked as closed according to the BMP criteria, 40 had one or more of the following
characteristics: average inflation over 1975-1990 higher than 10 percent, debt to GNP ratio in
1985 greater than 125 percent, a terms-of-trade decline of more than 20 percent, an institutional
quality index less than 5 (on a scale of 1 to 10), or involvement in a war.
Table IV.5 shows that there are also important threshold effects in the black market
premium.  If we insert the black market premium in the 1970s and 1980s as continuous variables
in the regression, the estimated coefficients are extremely weak and they fail to pass an F-test for
joint significance at 10 percent.
36  The strength of the Sachs-Warner result comes in great part
from the dichotomous nature of the BMP variable and from the fact that the 20 percent threshold
allows more weight to be placed on the observations for which the black market premia--and
probably also the underlying macroeconomic imbalances--are sufficiently high.
That the effect of the black market premium is highly sensitive to the macroeconomic and
political variables that one controls for is shown in Table IV.6, where we present the results of
controlling for each of the indicators of macroeconomic and political distress in Table IV.4.  In
three out of 5 cases, each one of these variables individually is enough to drive the coefficient on
BMP below conventional levels of significance.  If we insert all our controls together, the
estimated coefficient on BMP goes down by more than half and the t-statistic drops below 1.
This kind of evidence does not by itself prove that higher black market premia are
unrelated to growth performance.  The results in Table IV.6 can be due to high multicollinearity
between the black market premium and the indicators of macroeconomic and political distress
that we have chosen.  But what they do show is that there is very little in the data to help us
distinguish the effect of high black market premia from those of other plausible right-hand side
variables relating to macroeconomic distress.  In other words, they show that the black market
premium is not a good measure of trade policy, because it is also a proxy for many other
variables unrelated to trade policy.
Sensitivity of results
The interpretational problems with the State Monopoly of Exports and Black Market
Premium variables would not be so important if these two were responsible for only part of the
effect of the Sachs-Warner index on growth.  But the fact that they seem to be its overwhelming
determinant makes us worry about the extent to which the results speak meaningfully about the
role of trade policies.
The arguments in the previous two sections have shown that the individual coefficients
on MON and BMP are not very robust to controlling for variables such as an Africa dummy or
indicators of macroeconomic and political distress.  However, much of the force of the Sachs-
                                               
36 Their joint inclusion raises the adjusted R
2 from 0.359 to 0.382.23
Warner variable comes from its combination of the effects of MON and BMP.
37  The reason is
that the Sachs-Warner dummy uses MON to classify as closed all but one of the economies in
Sub-Saharan Africa and then uses BMP to classify as closed a set of economies with
macroeconomic and political difficulties.  It thus builds a “super variable” which is 1 for all non-
African economies without macroeconomic or political difficulties.  This variable will be
statistically stronger than either an Africa dummy or macroeconomic controls because it jointly
groups information from both.
To show how the Sachs-Warner approach works, we use two indicators of economic and
political disequilibrium, which are similar in method of construction to the Sachs-Warner
variable.  These are two synthetic indicators of macroeconomic and political distress and
institutional quality.  The first indicator, ICRG, is an index of institutional quality based on
underlying numerical evaluations relating to the rule of law, bureaucratic quality, corruption,
expropriation risk, and governmental repudiation of contracts (taken from Knack and Keefer
1995).  It ranges from 0 to 10, with higher values indicating superior institutions.  The second
indicator, which we call DISEQ, is a dummy variable which is equal to one if the country
exhibited signs of macroeconomic or political distress such as a debt-GNP ratio greater than
125%,
38 an average inflation greater than 10%, a decline in its terms of trade of more than 20%,
or involvement in war.  DISEQ is also equal to 0 if the country was in Africa.
39
The correlations of DISEQ and ICRG with OPEN are respectively 0.64 and 0.72.  Indeed,
if one introduces DISEQ and ICRG in a growth equation along with openness, the coefficient on
openness falls to less than half its original value and the t-statistic on it is barely above 2
(regression 2, Table IV.7).  Moreover, the Mauritius and Indonesia observations are key here: the
t-statistic falls to 1.62 if one classifies these countries as closed because of their export
monopolies (regression 3), and to 1.25 after regional dummies for Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and
Latin America are introduced (regression 4).
40
Alternatively, simply controlling for ICRG and a set of continent dummies also drives the
openness coefficient below conventional significance levels (regression 5).  Even though this
coefficient can be rendered significant again if one controls for the central government budget
                                               
37 For example, if MON and BMP are inserted, together with an Africa dummy and a measure of institutional quality
neither MON nor BMP are individually significant and the p-value for a joint significance test is 0.09. (If we add
NTB, TAR and SOC, the p-value rises to 0.31), but OPEN gets a t-statistic of 3.06 and BM one of 2.93 (SQT gets
1.46).
38 Our source data for the debt/GDP ratio is World Bank (1995).  Although this data covers only developing
countries, OECD (1998) indicates that for no OECD country did the gross government public debt exceed 125% of
GDP in 1985.
39 The rationale for including an Africa dummy in this regression is our argument that the MON variable is
essentially an Africa dummy.  The Africa dummy therefore puts DISEQ on an equal footing with the Sachs-Warner
dummy.
40 The t-statistic can fall even further (to 0.72) if one changes Sachs and Warner’s questionable classification of New
Zealand as a closed economy (see footnote 8).24
surplus and population growth, the t-statistic on the openness variable remains barely above 2,
with an absolute value less than half of that in the original regression (regression 6).
Statistically, the explanation for the fragility of the results on the coefficient of OPEN is
that we have introduced in the regression a set of measures of macroeconomic and political
distress which are highly correlated with growth and with the Sachs-Warner variable.  Indeed,
the high variability of the estimated coefficients in Table 7 is strongly indicative of
multicollinearity.
Therefore, we do not pretend to have answered in this analysis the question of whether it
is macroeconomic and political disruption that cause trade policy or the other way around.
41  Nor
do we give an answer to the question of whether all of these are determined in turn by some
other underlying variables such as poor institutions or anti-market ideology.  What we believe
we have established is that the statistical power of the Sachs-Warner indicator derives not from
the direct indicators of trade policy it incorporates, but from two components that we have
reasons to believe will yield upwardly biased estimates of the effects of trade restrictions.  The
Sachs-Warner measure is so correlated with plausible groupings of alternative explanatory
variables--macroeconomic instability, poor institutions, location in Africa--that it is risky to draw
strong inferences about the effect of openness on growth based on its coefficient in a growth
regression.
V.  Sebastian Edwards (1998)
The third paper that we discuss is Sebastian Edward’s recent Economic Journal paper
“Openness, Productivity and Growth: What Do We Really Know?” (Edwards 1998).   The
papers by Dollar and by Sachs and Warner deal with data problems by constructing new
openness indicators.  Edwards takes the alternative approach of analyzing the robustness of the
openness-growth relationship to the use of different indicators.  As Edwards states, “ the
difficulties in defining satisfactory summary indexes suggest that researchers should move away
from this area, and should instead concentrate on determining whether econometric results are
robust to alternative indexes” (1998, 386).  The presumption is that the imperfections in specific
indicators would not seem quite as relevant if the estimated positive coefficient on openness is
found to be robust to differences in the way openness is measured.
To carry out this robustness analysis, Edwards runs regressions of total factor
productivity growth on nine alternative indicators of openness (as well as initial income and a
measure of schooling).
42  His estimates of total factor productivity growth are the Solow
residuals from panel regressions of growth on changes of capital and labor inputs. The nine
                                               
41 The Sachs-Warner view is that causality goes from restrictive trade policies to macroeconomic instability
(personal communication with Sachs).  For the purposes of the present paper, we are agnostic about the existence or
direction of any causality.  An argument that macroeconomic imbalances are largely unrelated to trade policies is
not difficult to make, and receives considerable support from cross-national evidence (see Rodrik 1999, chap. 4).
42 In an earlier and heavily cited paper, Edwards (1992) carried out a similar analysis for growth rates of real GDP
per capita using a somewhat different set of nine alternative indicators of trade policy distortions.  We focus here on
Edwards (1998) because it is more recent and the data set used in the earlier paper was not immediately available.25
indicators of openness he uses are: (i) the Sachs-Warner openness index; (ii) the World Bank’s
subjective classification of trade strategies in World Development Report 1987; (iii) Edward
Leamer’s (1988) openness index, built on the basis of the average residuals from regressions of
trade flows; (iv) the average black market premium; (v) the average import tariffs from
UNCTAD via Barro and Lee (1994); (vi) the average coverage of non-tariff barriers, also from
UNCTAD via Barro and Lee (1994); (vii) the subjective Heritage Foundation index of
Distortions in International Trade; (viii) the ratio of total revenues on trade taxes (exports +
imports) to total trade; and (ix) Holger Wolf’s regression-based index of import distortions for
1985.
The results Edwards presents are weighted least squares (WLS) regressions of TFP
growth on (i)-(ix), where the weighting variable is GDP per capita in 1985.  They are shown in
column 1, rows 1-9, of Table V.1: six of the nine indicators are significant and all but one have
the expected sign.  He repeats the analysis using instrumental weighted least squares (column 1,
Table V.2), and finds 5 of 9 indicators significant at 10% (3 at 5%) and all having the "correct"
sign.
43  He also builds an additional indicator as the first principal component of (i), (iv), (v), (vi)
and (ix), which he finds to be significant in WLS estimation (row 10, Table V.1).  He concludes
that “these results are quite remarkable, suggesting with tremendous consistency that there is a
significantly positive relationship between openness and productivity growth.”
We will argue that Edwards' evidence does not warrant such strong claims.  The
robustness of the regression results, we will show, is largely an artifact of weighting and
identification assumptions that seem to us to be inappropriate.   Of the 19 different specifications
reported in Edwards (1998), only 3 produce results that are statistically significant at
conventional levels once we qualify these assumptions.  Furthermore, the specifications that pass
econometric scrutiny are based on data that suffer from serious anomalies and subjectivity bias.
The problem with weighting
The justification for the resort to weighted least squares estimation is not provided in the
paper, but it is presumably to correct for possible heteroskedasticity in the residuals.  If
disturbances are not homoskedastic, ordinary least squares estimates will be inefficient.   If the
form of the skedastic function is known, then it is appropriate to use weighted least squares.
This is indeed what Edwards implicitly assumes when he uses GDP per capita as his weighting
variable.  If it is unknown, one can use White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance
matrix estimator, which is not dependent on the form taken by the heteroskedasticity.
When there is heteroskedasticity, the standard deviation of the disturbance in the growth
equation varies systematically across countries.  Edward’s decision to weight his observations by
the level of GDP per capita implies an assumption that the standard deviation of the disturbances
in the growth equation is inversely proportional to the square root of the level of GDP per capita
in 1985.  In other words, if the United States is--as it in effect was in 1985 according to the
Summers-Heston data—59 times wealthier than Ethiopia, the standard deviation of the growth
                                               
43 In his paper, Edwards erroneously claims that two additional variables are significant in the IV-2SLS estimation:
Leamer’s index and Tariffs.  This mistake was apparently due to two typographical errors in his Table 4, p. 393.26
rate conditional on having the United States’ income is 7.7 (59
1/2) times higher than conditional
on having Ethiopia’s income.  Using the estimates of the residuals’ standard deviation from one
of the Edwards equations, we can calculate the implied root mean squared error of the growth
rate conditional on having the incomes of the United Sates and of Ethiopia.  The former is .8
percentage points, whereas the latter is 6 percentage points. It may be reasonable to suppose that
growth data for poor countries are less reliable than that for rich countries, but the errors implied
by Edwards' weighting assumption for poor countries’ growth data seem to us to be
unreasonably high.  As a matter of fact, it is hard to think of a reason to be doing regression
analysis on a broad cross-section of primarily poor countries if we believe that underdeveloped
nations’ economic data are this uninformative.
Column 2 of Tables V.1 and V.2 repeat Edwards’ regressions using the log of 1985 per
capita GDP as the weighting variable.  In terms of our calculations above, the ratio between the
US and Ethiopian standard deviations would now be a more reasonable 1.31.  This set of
regressions results in six of the eighteen coefficients having the “wrong” sign.  Five out of nine
coefficients are significant among the least squares regressions (four at 5%), and two out of nine
in the instrumental variables regressions. The coefficient on the principal components variable
now becomes insignificant.
44
One way to put aside doubts about the appropriateness of alternative assumptions
regarding the nature of the skedastic function is to use White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors, which are robust to the form of heteroskedasticity.  We show these
estimates in column 3 of Tables V.1 and V.2.  Four out of nine coefficients are now significant
among the least squares regressions (three at 5%) and two out of nine among the IV regressions.
Only twelve of the eighteen coefficients have the correct sign.  The principal components
variable is also insignificant.
The problem with identification
The two significant IV coefficients in Table V.2 are moreover quite sensitive to the
specification of the instrument lists.  In particular, equations 12 and 17 in Table V.2 are two of
the only three equations in which the Heritage Foundation Index of Property Rights Protection is
used as an instrument by Edwards.
45  If this instrument is not excludable from the second stage
regression, Edwards’ IV estimation will give biased estimates of the coefficient of openness on
                                               
44 Why does weighting by GDP give such different results?  The reason seems to be that there is a relationship
between the openness indices used by Edwards and TFP growth at high levels of income. This relationship in itself
is apparently driven by the fact that the great majority of economies with restrictive trade practices and high levels
of GDP per capita in 1985 were oil exporters. Because of their high incomes, these economies are weighted very
heavily in the WLS regressions.   It is well-known that oil exporting economies had very low rates of growth during
the 1980s (see for example the studies in Gelb, 1988). If one redoes regressions 1-19 using GDP per capita weights
but including a dummy for oil exporters one gets very similar results to those in column 3 of Tables 1 and 2: only
the coefficients for the World Development Report Index (equations 2,12), the Heritage Foundation Index
(equations 7,17) and the least squares estimate of the collected taxes ratio (equation 8) remain significant, and the
least squares coefficient on quotas changes sign.
45 His other instruments include: TFP growth in the 1970s and the black market premium, export/GDP, import/GDP
and terms of trade changes for the 1975-79 period.27
growth.  Theoretically, it seems to us unreasonable to assert that the protection of property rights
can effectively be assumed not to be an important determinant of growth, given the extensive
literature concerned precisely with such an effect.
46  In Table V.3 we show that, if property rights
are included in the second-stage regression for these two equations, this term gets a significant
coefficient in equation 12 (World Development Report Index) and a positive albeit insignificant
coefficient in Equation 17 (Heritage Foundation Index).  Chi-squared tests of the overidentifying
restrictions also reject the null hypothesis that these restrictions hold for equation 12.
Furthermore, in both equations the t-statistic on the openness proxy falls to well below .5 in
absolute value.
If we take seriously the fact that property rights are not excludable from the productivity
growth regressions, we are left with the conclusion that, among 19 different specifications, we
find evidence of a negative and statistically significant correlation between trade-restricting
policies and productivity growth in only 3 cases.  Those are the ones that use the Collected Taxes
Ratio, the World Development Report Index, or the Heritage Foundation Index.  We take up
some problems with these indices in the next subsection.
Data issues
Edwards reports that the Collected Taxes Ratio (which measures trade tax revenue as a
proportion of total trade) is calculated from raw data provided by the IMF.  We are puzzled by
this data because many of the numbers for developing countries are implausible.  India, a country
with one of the world's highest tariff rates, is listed as having an average ratio of 2.4 percent,
lower than the sample average and barely above the value for Chile (2.3 percent).   The mean
value of the Collected Taxes Ratio in the sample is 2.8 percent, which strikes us as very low.
We have attempted to replicate Edwards' results using data from the World Bank’s most
recent (1998) World Development Indicators.  This source, which was not available at the time
the Edwards analysis was first conducted, provides collected trade tax ratios for imports and
exports separately, which we have combined to derive an index in the spirit of Edwards'
variable.
47  According to this index, India's average trade tax is 37.3 percent (a more plausible
figure than Edwards' 2.4 percent).  We replicate equation 7 of Table V.1 with this data, and the
results are shown in Table V.4.  The coefficient on average duties is now positive albeit
insignificant (column 2).  If we introduce import and export duties separately (column 3), import
duties in fact get a positive and significant coefficient (contrary to the expected negative
coefficient) and export duties are insignificant.  One shortcoming of these specifications
                                               
46 Barro (1997) names “the importance of institutions that ensure property rights and free markets,” for economic
growth as one of the “dominant themes” of his recent research (p. xiv).  For examples of the literature emphasizing
the importance of property rights for economic growth, see Clague, Knack, Keefer, and Olson (1996), Acheson and
McFetridge (1996), Jodha (1996), Tornell (1997), Park and Ginarte (1997) and Grossman and Kim (1996).
47 As our earlier discussion showed, when imports and exports are both taxed, their distortionary effect is
multiplicative rather than additive.  So instead of summing import and export taxes, we use the formula
(1+mdut)x(1+xdut) - 1, where mdut (xdut) is import (export) duties as a percent of imports (exports).  We take the
average of observations for 1980-85.  Our results (on the sign and insignificance of the coefficient on trade taxes)
are unchanged, however, when we take the simple sum mdut + xdut.28
(including Edwards') is the small sample size (between 43 and 45).  Since export duties are not
reported for many countries, one way of increasing the sample size is to introduce only the
import duty variable from the World Development Indicators database.  This increases the
sample size to 66 countries.  The estimated coefficient on import duties is once again positive
and insignificant (column 4).
These results are in line with others we have reported earlier: there is little evidence that
simple averages of trade taxes are significantly and negatively correlated with growth.
The other two variables that are significant are the subjective indexes constructed by the
World Bank and the Heritage Foundation.  It is striking that two subjective indexes are the only
variables that are robust to our econometric analysis, since subjective indexes are well known to
suffer from judgment biases.  Indeed, a look at the two indexes reveals some striking contrasts.
In the Heritage Foundation Index, for example, Chile and Uganda are in the same category (4 on
a scale of 1 to 5, where 5 is most protected), and Bolivia is as open as the United States (with a
score of 2).
There is an additional problem in the use of the Heritage Index, aside from subjectivity
bias.  The index rates trade policy restrictions in 1996, well after the end of the period covered by
Edwards’ dependent variable (1980-1990).  Changes in trade policy that occurred in the late
1980s or after 1990 should not be relevant for explaining TFP growth between 1980 and 1990.
For example, there are several countries--such as Bolivia and Turkey--which liberalized their
trade regimes significantly in the second half of the 1980s and which get high openness ratings
from the Heritage Index, but would be classified quite differently for the early 1980s.
To gauge the magnitude of the problem, we recalculate the Heritage Foundation Index
using the same methodology but with tariff and non-tariff barrier data from 1985-88 from Lee
(1993), the earliest date for which there is systematic information.
48   The resulting index is
highly correlated with the Heritage Index (the simple correlation is 0.71).  But it enters with an
insignificant coefficient (with a t-statistic below 1) when we replicate equation (7) using it
instead of the 1996 Heritage Foundation Index (Table V.4, column 6).  We conclude from this
exercise that the significance of the Heritage Index variable in Edwards' regressions probably
derives from changes in trade policies that took place after 1990 (perhaps because faster growing
countries liberalized faster in the late 1980s and early 1990s).
The remaining significant variable is the World Bank’s 1987 World Development Report
subjective index. This index divides countries into four groups using primary data on the
effective rate of protection, use of non-tariff barriers, use of export incentives, and degree of
exchange rate overvaluation.  Since this index rates only a small number of countries, regression
(2) in Table V.1 uses only 32 observations.  Again the anomalies in this index are striking: high-
growth Korea is rated as more open than moderate-growth Malaysia despite having higher tariff
                                               
48   We follow as closely as possible the procedure described in the Heritage Foundation Report (Johnson and
Sheehy 1996, 27).  Specifically, we rate a country according to the maximum of its tariff rate and non-tariff barrier
coverage ratio: higher than 20%: "very high" (a rating of 5); between 15 and 20%: "high" (4); between 10 and 15%:
"moderate" (3); between 5 and 10%: "low" (2); and between 0 and 5%: "very low" (1).29
rates and non-tariff barrier coverage (according to Lee 1993), higher exchange rate distortions
(according to Dollar) and a lower export/GDP ratio.  Moderate-growth Tunisia, which had
average tariffs of 21% and average non-tariff coverage of 54%, is classified in the same group as
Chile, Malaysia and Thailand.  In fact, in his 1993 literature review, Edwards (1993, 1386-1387)
himself drew attention to serious problems with this index.  As he noted, Chile, which in other
studies is rated as the most open economy in the developing world, was grouped in the second
category (moderately outward oriented); Korea was classified in the group of most open
economies for both the 1963-73 period and the 1973-85 period despite the fact that during 1963-
73 the Korean trade regime was considerably more restrictive than in the latter subperiod.  Given
that the primary data which was used to construct this index is no different from that used in
some of the other empirical work we have discussed in this and other sections of our paper, we
believe it is likely that its significance derives from the subjective biases that have entered into
the process of classifying countries.
In sum, we do not concur with Edwards’s assertion that the cross-country data reveal the
existence of a robust relationship between openness and productivity or GDP growth.
49  In our
view, there is little evidence to support such an assertion.  The results reviewed in this section are
for the most part highly dependent on questionable weighting and identification assumptions.
The trade-policy indicators whose significance is not affected by these assumptions either are
subjective indexes apparently highly contaminated by judgement biases or lack robustness to the
use of more credible information from alternative data sources.
VI.  Dan Ben-David (1993)
The last of the papers we discuss takes an altogether different approach to studying the
impact of openness on economic growth.  Dan Ben-David’s 1993 QJE paper “Equalizing
Exchange: Trade Liberalization and Income Convergence” measures the effect of trade policies
on income by asking whether trade liberalization leads to a reduction in the dispersion of income
levels among liberalizing countries (i.e., whether it contributes to what has been called s-
convergence).  We pick Ben-David as an example of a strand of the literature which has centered
on studying the effect of trade on convergence.  Another example can be found in Sachs and
Warner’s BPEA paper discussed in Section IV, in which the authors show that countries that
were open according to their definition experienced faster growth if their initial income levels
were low (b-convergence) while countries that were closed showed no relationship between
growth rates and initial income levels.  In addition, a distinctive aspect of Ben-David's work is
that it is non-parametric and not regression-based.
The expectation that trade liberalization might lead to income convergence is grounded in
the factor price equalization (FPE) theorem.  According to trade theory, free trade in goods leads
to the equalization of factor prices under certain conditions (including an equal numbers of goods
and factors, identical technologies, and absence of transport costs).  As barriers to trade are
                                               
49 Our results are basically unaltered if we use growth of GDP per capita from 1980 to 1990 instead of TFP growth
as the dependent variable.  In this case the World Bank and Heritage Foundation indexes remain significant but the
Collected Trade Taxes Ratio is now only significant at a 10% level and the Black Market Premium is insignificant.
Similar results emerge for instrumental variables estimation.30
relaxed (and assuming in addition that differences in capital-labor ratios and labor-force
participation ratios do not countervail), a tendency towards FPE can be set into motion, resulting
in convergence in per capita incomes.
In a recent critique of this strand of the literature, Matthew Slaughter (1997) has argued
that a great part of the convergence experienced by the European economies studied by Ben-
David and by Sachs and Warner's "open" economies occurs because of convergence in capital-
labor ratios rather than factor prices.  It is less clear how this convergence could be caused by
trade liberalization.
Let us however assume that there is a valid channel of causation from trade liberalization
to convergence in capital-labor ratios.  In itself, there is no necessary relationship between the
level of dispersion in incomes and the growth rate.  Countries could in principle be converging to
lower levels of GDP per capita.  But in the case of the European Community, on which Ben-
David concentrates, the convergence experienced was indeed to higher level of incomes.  Overall
growth from 1945 to 1994 of the EC5 (Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Italy, and Germany)
was 3.45 percent, compared to 1.21 percent between 1900 and 1939 and 1.16% from 1870 to
1899.  Therefore, if Ben-David’s claim is right, convergence in the EEC was achieved by raising
the income of poor countries rather than by lowering that of rich countries.
That a decrease in the dispersion of incomes among European economies coincided with
economic integration is straightforward to establish.  The dispersion of log incomes among
Belgium, France, the Netherlands and Italy is reproduced as the solid line in Figure VI.1. This
series is taken from Ben-David’s paper, which relied on Maddison’s (1982) long-run growth
data.  It is evident that there is a pronounced decrease in dispersion during the post-war period.
50
Ben-David’s argument, of course, goes beyond simply ascertaining that a decrease in
dispersion occurred during the postwar era.  He tries to show that trade liberalization caused this
decrease by discarding other plausible alternatives.  Thus he argues (i) that the observed
convergence was not simply a continuation of a long-term convergence trend unrelated to
postwar economic integration; (ii) that the European countries that chose not to enter a free-trade
agreement did not experience the same levels of convergence as the EEC; (iii) and that other
subsets of economies in the world which were not economically integrated did not experience
convergence.  We examine each of his arguments in turn.
Was European convergence a continuation of a long-term trend?
In support of the argument that the reduction in dispersion was not simply the
continuation of a long-run trend, Ben-David argues that the series of per capita income
dispersion (solid line in Figure VI.1) does not show any visible downward tendency before the
postwar era.  When presenting this series, Ben-David excludes Germany from the calculations,
51
arguing that not doing so would bias the conclusion in favor of convergence:
                                               
50 Similar results obtain if one uses the Summers and Heston data.
51 Luxembourg is also excluded because Maddison does not provide data for it.31
Germany was always among the poorest, in per capita terms, of the six countries.  Today,
it is one of the wealthiest countries in Europe.  As a result of its heightened prosperity, it
might be claimed that all of the convergence that has been witnessed within the EEC is
due to the behavior of Germany.  Thus, its exclusion should bias the results away from
convergence. (Ben-David 1993, 662)
Note however that the purpose of Figure VI.1 (Figure VII in Ben-David’s paper) is not only to
establish the existence of convergence following postwar liberalization, but also to establish the
absence of a long-term trend in convergence pre-dating it.  Thus the exclusion of Germany from
the series, which biases the results against convergence, would also bias the results in favor of
the hypothesis that there was no pre-war convergence trend, had Germany's convergence
occurred before the post-war period.
That is indeed what happened.  Between 1870 and the eve of World War II, Germany’s
income went from less than 50% to 87% of the average for the remaining members of the EEC.
And by 1958, one year after the EEC was formed, Germany had surpassed Belgium as the leader
of the five.  The exclusion of Germany therefore has the effect of understating the fall in
dispersion before the creation of the EEC.  The dashed line in Figure VI.1, which calculates
dispersion of log per capita incomes including Germany, shows this.  Once Germany is included
in the sample, it appears that dispersion has been on a downward trend since 1870.  The
hypothesis that postwar convergence was simply a continuation of a long-term trend can no
longer be rejected easily, raising doubts about the conclusion that convergence was caused by
postwar trade policies.
52
Figure VI.2 plots the standard deviation of log incomes for the original members of the
EEC, now using Maddison’s more recent (1995) estimates and including Germany.  We reach
the same conclusion as in Figure VI.1:
53 dispersion has followed a downward trend since the
beginning of the 20
th century.  From a peak of 0.36 in 1897, dispersion had fallen to 0.25 in
1930, and 0.19 in 1939.  By the time the EEC was created, it had fallen to 0.16.  It appears
therefore that the further reduction in dispersion that followed the creation of the EEC (to 0.06
by 1994) was a continuation of a long-term trend that predated European integration.  Moreover,
this conclusion is not sensitive to whether Germany is included in the sample: that is because
Maddison's (1995) revised estimates suggest that there was a uniform pattern of convergence
                                               
52 Ben-David (in personal communication) has pointed out to us that much of the pre-war convergence is due to the
fact that "while the other countries were in the Depression, Germany surged ahead as Hitler built his war machine."
Indeed, dispersion appears trendless from 1900 to 1932, and starts falling only as Germany’s income rises during the
National Socialist period.  But we are not sure of what to make of that fact.  Germany's income remained high after
the war--compared to other European countries--suggesting that not all of the convergence was due to the policies of
the Nazi period or to the buildup of the war machine.  In any case, Nazi Germany pursued highly protectionist
policies, so that its experience sheds doubt on the argument that poor countries that close their economies experience
slower growth.  Finally, the observation for 1870 in Figure VI.1 suggests that dispersion was much higher in the late
nineteenth century than in 1930.  The last point is confirmed when we examine Maddison's (1995) more recent
estimates (see Figure VI.2), which provide a fuller picture of trends in dispersion since 1820.  These estimates were
not available to Ben-David at the time his paper was written.
53 Figure VI.2 may strike the eye as different from Figure VI.1 because it plots dispersion since 1825 (Figure VI.1
starts in 1870) and uses yearly data for the 1870-1900 period (Figure VI.1 had just 1 observation for 1870 and yearly
observations for 1900 on).32
during the pre-World War I period, with Italy, France, and Germany all catching up with
Belgium and the Netherlands.
A closer look at Figure VI.2 suggests that there is in fact very little association between
episodes of economic integration and s-convergence over time (see also Table VI.1).  The period
leading up to 1878 was an era of continuous trade liberalization, at the level of both national
markets and international ones.  This period witnessed the creation of the German Zollverein
(1833) and the unification of Italy (1860), as well as the signing of free trade agreements
between Prussia and Belgium (1844), France and Belgium (1842), France and Prussia (1862),
France and Italy (1863), and France and the Netherlands (1865).
54  Most of these bilateral
agreements had most favored nation clauses, extending the benefits of bilateral liberalization to
third countries.  Yet, despite increasing economic integration, dispersion more than doubled from
1820 to 1880 (from 0.14 to 0.29).
55
The retreat from free trade started during the 1880s, with Germany’s Tariff Act of 1879.
Italy raised tariffs in 1878 and 1887, France in 1881 and 1892.
56  This rise in protection followed
the depression of the 1870s and was motivated by the desire to protect European farmers from
the influx of cheap American grain imports (which began to undersell German grain in 1875)
while at the same time compensating industry for the increased wages of their workers.
57
Nevertheless, as Figure VI.2 shows, the period from the 1880s to World War I was, if anything,
one of convergence.
58
The breakdown in world trade that followed World War I and the spread of beggar-thy-
neighbor protectionist policies adopted during the great depression seem also to have had very
                                               
54 The discussion in this and the following two paragraphs borrows heavily from Chapter V of Pollard (1974).
Above we list treaties between countries included in Figure VI.2, but the extent of trade liberalization from 1820 to
1878 in Europe was impressive. Prussia signed free trade treaties with Britain (1841 and 1860), Turkey (1839),
Greece (1840), Austria (1868), Spain (1868), Switzerland (1869), Mexico (1869) and Japan (1869),  France with
Britain (1860), Switzerland (1864), Sweden, Norway, the Hanse Towns and Spain (1865), Austria (1866) and
Portugal (1867), Belgium with Britain (1862), Italy with Britain (1862), Turkey and Greece (1839-40).  Aside from
the MFN clause, measures were taken to ease international trade such as the inclusion in the Treaties of Berlin of
clauses extending commercial freedoms to foreign citizens (1878, 1885).  There were even attempts to create
customs unions between France and Germany and France and its neighbors.
55 A caveat applies here: for the 1820-1850 period, we rely on just two observations: one for 1820, and another one
for 1850.  Since the 1850 observation for Italy was not available, we constructed it as the result of a linear
interpolation between the 1820 and the 1870 observation.  Even if we disregard the evidence before 1870, the yearly
data from 1870-1880 indicate that the increase in dispersion predated the first protectionist measures.
56 Again, tariff adoption was widespread, with only Holland and the United Kingdom resisting the reversion towards
protectionism.
57 In effect, high tariffs worked to the detriment of labor in what came to be known in Germany as the “compact of
rye and iron.”  See Gerschenkron (1943) and Rogowski (1989) for detailed discussions of this era.  As Rogowski
points out, the reversion towards protectionism was more accentuated in capital poor countries such as Germany,
Italy and France than in capital rich countries such as Belgium and the Netherlands.
58 O'Rourke's (1997) econometric study of this period (1975-1914), covering a panel of 10 countries, finds that
higher tariffs were correlated with faster economic growth, and that the estimated effects are quantitatively large.33
little effect on dispersion.   Even though fascist governments in Italy and Germany raised
agricultural tariffs and other protectionist barriers, and in France the power of agricultural groups
was high enough to drive the French price of wheat in 1939 to three times its price in London
(Cobban 1965, 156), on the eve of World War II dispersion stood at its lowest level since the
1860s.
In sum, Figure VI.2 shows no long-run tendency for trade liberalization to be associated
with greater convergence in per-capita incomes.  If anything, it shows increasing dispersion
during the 19
th century and falling dispersion during the 20
th century.  While one can interpret
this evidence in different ways, we find the most straightforward reading to be that World War II
convergence was in fact a continuation of a long-run trend that got started around the turn of the
20th century.
Did non-EEC European countries experience convergence?
Ben-David also claims that countries in Europe that did not undertake trade liberalization
failed to experience convergence.  He supports his argument by showing that (a) there was no
convergence among the UK, Denmark and Ireland until they began to relax their trade
restrictions vis-à-vis Europe, and that (b) EFTA countries experienced significant convergence
with the EEC as trade barriers among them were liberalized.
To demonstrate (a), Ben-David plots the standard deviation among the UK, Denmark and
Ireland, both of which started liberalizing trade with the EEC in the mid-1960s.  He shows that
their dispersion among themselves started falling only after 1965.  It is not clear to us why this is
the relevant test, since the trade liberalization in question took place between these countries and
Europe as well as amongst themselves.  In Figure VI.3, we show that even if there is an
indication of convergence among these three countries after 1965, it is not caused by
convergence to the mean income of EEC members.  Ireland has shown very little convergence to
the EEC until recent years, and Denmark has oscillated close to the EEC average since the
1950s.  The UK has been converging--downward--to the EEC level steadily (at least) since the
1950s.  None of the three countries seem to experience different patterns of convergence after
they relaxed trade restrictions with the EEC in 1965.
As regards (b), there has indeed been substantial convergence by EEC and EFTA
member countries to the European mean since the 1950s.  But we are skeptical whether such
convergence can be attributed to trade liberalization.  In Figure VI.4, we plot the contribution to
the variance around the European mean
59 of three subsets of European countries: the six
members of the European Economic Community, the seven members of the European Free
                                               














˛ ￿  for J={EEC6, EFTA6, Others}.  Normalization by the mean achieves the same
purpose as calculating the variance of log incomes--and is more appropriate for large income differences--and
putting the expression in terms of the variance--and not the standard deviation--ensures that the three components
sum to the total.34
Trade Association,
60 and six remaining European countries which did not join either EFTA or
the EEC.
61  It is evident from Figure VI.5 that all subgroups have experienced substantial
convergence.  The non-EFTA and non-EEC countries have seen their contribution to the
variance around the European mean fall from 0.085 to 0.034 from 1950 to 1992 (see Table
VI.2).
62   European convergence seems to be the result of factors largely unrelated to trade
liberalization.
Did other areas of the world experience convergence?
To add plausibility to the story that trade liberalization was behind the European trend
towards convergence in the postwar era, Ben-David shows that subsets of countries that have not
become integrated have experienced no tendency to converge. He points to the well-known fact
that the dispersion of world incomes has not decreased in the postwar era (it has actually
increased).  He also shows that the dispersion of incomes among the world’s 25 richest countries
(excluding the EEC6) has not decreased either.  He compares these experiences with those of
economically integrated Europe and U.S. states to show that convergence seems to occur only
when there is substantial trade liberalization.
There is an asymmetry in his selection of diverging and converging areas, however.
Whereas the regions he shows to be converging are all close to each other geographically, those
which are diverging are not.  To have a fair standard of comparison, one must ask whether trade
liberalization--or its absence--among geographically adjacent economies would lead towards
convergence or divergence.
Did subsets of geographically adjacent economies that liberalized trade tend to observe
convergence?   Figures VI.5 and VI.6 show two important cases in which the trends in
convergence go counter to what we would expect on the basis of Ben-David’s argument.  They
plot the dispersion of per capita incomes for two regions with radically different trade policies
and which are by conventional accounts the canonical examples of open and closed economies:
East Asia and Latin America.
63  According to conventional wisdom, the relatively open East
Asian economies should have converged, whereas the relatively closed South American
economies should have diverged.  Figure VI.5 shows that East Asia seems to have steadily
diverged since the 1960s, with the standard deviation of its log incomes going from 0.47 in 1960
                                               
60 Austria, Switzerland, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Finland and the United Kingdom.  Even though Portugal was
officially a member of EFTA, it was allowed to implement tariffs and to deviate from EFTA policies, so we follow
Ben-David in treating it as a non-EFTA country.
61 Cyprus, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Portugal and Spain.
62 If one includes Turkey as a seventh country in this group the contribution to dispersion goes from 0.103 in 1950 to
0.053 in 1992.  An alternative measure of dispersion around the European mean is the standard deviation of log
incomes around the mean log income.  The latter measure for the non-EEC, non-EFTA countries falls from 0.15 in
1950 to 0.05 in 1990 (0.20 to 0.10 if Turkey is included).
63 The East Asian countries are Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore,
Taiwan, and Thailand (data are from Summers-Heston).  Latin American countries are Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Mexico, and Peru (data are from Maddison 1995, Summers-Heston 1994, and World Bank 1998).35
to 0.81 in 1989.
64  As for Latin America, Figure VI.6 shows a steady decrease in dispersion
during the period of import substitution,
65 from 0.55 before the Great Depression to 0.20 in the
late 1980s.  More striking, dispersion jumps upwards just as Latin America starts to liberalize its
trade.
66
Figure VI.7 points to another important counter-example: it plots the ratio of U.S. GDP
per capita to the average GDP per capita for its three main European trading partners (the UK,
France and Germany) up to 1938.
67  Trade with Europe was approximately two-thirds of total
U.S. trade during the nineteenth century,
68 and the bulk of that was with these three countries.  It
is however evident from Figure VI.7 that despite declining levels of import duties the U.S. and
Europe steadily diverged between 1820 and 1938.  Again, there seems to be no evident
relationship between trade liberalization and income convergence.
The point of these examples is to show that it is relatively easy to come up with cases of
regions of the world which have diverged or converged in ways unrelated to trade policy.
Whereas Europe is a case of a region in which convergence has been accompanied by trade
liberalization, there are many other cases where the opposite has happened.  Hence we remain
doubtful that there is a systematic relationship between trade liberalization and convergence.
We close by drawing attention to Slaughter's (1998) recent examination of the same
issue.  Slaughter undertakes a systematic analysis by comparing convergence patterns among
liberalizing countries before and after liberalization with the convergence pattern among
randomly chosen control countries before and after liberalization.  As he emphasizes, this
                                               
64 From 0.50 to 0.73 if the Philippines is excluded.
65 Latin American import substitution policies started rather spontaneously as a response to the collapse of world-
wide demand for raw materials in 1929 and the adoption of protectionist measures by the U.S. and Britain in 1930
and 1931.  Most countries abandoned convertibility and imposed trade barriers during this period and did not
liberalize until recent years (see Díaz Alejandro, 1981).
66 Chile liberalized in 1975-79, Mexico in 1986, Argentina and Brazil in 1990, Colombia and Peru in 1991 (dates are
from Edwards 1995).  Although data from Maddison is available for Venezuela, it is omitted from the graph because
Venezuela’s low growth during the postwar period, mainly caused by falling per capita oil revenues, tends to
amplify the convergence (private communication with Ben-David).  If it is included, dispersion goes from an
average value of 0.48 in the 1930s to 0.55 in the 1950s, and then drops steadily to 0.29 in the 1980s. Dispersion for a
wider sample of Latin American countries from 1950-1992 from the Summers-Heston or World Bank data is
generally either stable or falling from 1950 to the mid-1980s, but rises sharply during the late 1980s and early 1990s.
67 The cutoff date of 1938 is chosen because during World War II the Americas overtook Europe as the main
destination for U.S. exports.  The Americas overtook Europe as the main source of imports much earlier, during
World War I.  Including observations after 1940 would not change our results: U.S. GDP per capita in 1994 was still
27% higher than that of its three main European trading partners despite the fact that after 1944 tariff rates stayed
well into the single digits (Bureau of the Census, 1989).  Choosing the Americas instead of Europe as a standard of
comparison would strengthen our results, as the divergence between U.S. and Latin American incomes during the
19
th and 20
th century has been extremely high (see Haber 1997) and Canada represents only about half of U.S. trade
with the Americas.
68 Before World War II exports to Europe were 43% of total exports and imports from Europe were 29% of total
imports (Bureau of the Census 1989).36
difference-in-differences approach avoids the pitfalls of before-and-after comparisons (non-
liberalizing countries too may exhibit the same pattern before and after) or of comparing
liberalizing countries to non-liberalizing ones (the liberalizing countries may have been
converging prior to the liberalization as well).  Hence Slaughter's approach amounts to a more
systematic version of the kind of exercise we have carried out above by way of specific
illustrations (note, however, but using only post-World War II data).
Slaughter focuses specifically on four instances of trade liberalization: formation of the
EEC, formation of EFTA, liberalization between EEC and EFTA, and Kennedy Round tariff cuts
under the GATT.  His conclusion:
trade liberalization did not trigger convergence in any of the four cases.  If anything,
trade [liberalization] seems to have caused income divergence…  In all four cases, the
large majority of the 10,000 difference in difference estimates are not significantly
different from zero, and the average among the significant estimates indicates that
liberalization tends to diverge incomes.  (Slaughter 1998, 1)
Slaughter finds convergence in all of his cases prior to liberalization; none of his cases,
furthermore, exhibit an acceleration of convergence post-liberalization.  This parallels our results
above.
VII.  Other recent work
Before we close, we mention briefly some other recent papers that have examined the
connection between openness and economic growth.  We focus on three papers in particular: Lee
(1993), Harrison (1996), and Wacziarg (1998).  These papers are of interest because they contain
some methodological innovations.
Lee (1993) reasons, on the basis of an analytical model, that the distortionary effects of
trade restrictions should be larger in economies that, in the absence of trade restrictions, would
be more exposed to trade.  Hence he interacts an indicator of trade policy with a measure of what
he calls "free trade openness" (FREEOP).
69  The latter is constructed by regressing observed
import shares on land area, distance from major trading partners, import tariffs, and black-market
premia, and then calculating the predicted value of imports when the actual values of tariffs
black-market premia are replaced by zeros.  He finds that this composite measure (FREETAR)
enters a growth regression with an estimated coefficient that is negative and statistically
significant.
Lee uses two indicators of trade policy: an import-weighted tariff average and the black-
market premium.  We have discussed above the shortcomings of the latter as a measure of trade
policy (when reviewing Sachs and Warner, 1995).  The problem with Lee's tariff variable, as Lee
(1993, 320) acknowledges, is that the underlying tariff data are from  "various years in the
1980s"--the tail-end of the 1960-85 period over which his growth regressions are run.  This
raises the possibility of reverse causation: countries that perform well tend to liberalize their
trade regime eventually.  To check for this possibility, we have repeated Lee's regression, using
                                               
69 Specifically, the composite measure is constructed as FREETAR = FREEOP·log(1+tariff).37
the same specification and tariff variable, but over the subsequent time period 1980-94.
70  While
the estimated coefficient on FREETAR is negative for this later period, it is nowhere near
significant (t-statistic = - 0.80).
Harrison's (1996) main methodological contribution is to examine the relationship
between trade policy and growth in a panel setting, using fixed effects for countries.  This
approach has the advantage that it enables the analyst to look for evidence of the effects of trade
liberalization within countries.
71  But it has the disadvantage that the available time series are
necessarily short, requiring the use of annual data or (at most) five-year averages.  It may be a lot
to ask such data to reveal much about the relationship between trade policy and growth, both
because of the likely lags involved and the contamination from business-cycle effects.
72
Harrison uses seven indicators of trade policy, and finds that three of these "exhibit a
robust relationship with GDP growth" (1996, 443).  These three are the following:  (a) the black-
market premium; (b) a measure based on the price level of a country's tradables (relative to
international prices); and (c) a subjective measure of trade liberalization constructed at the World
Bank.  We have already discussed at length the problems involved in interpreting measures of
each of these types as indicators of trade policy.
Finally, the paper by Wacziarg (1998) is an ambitious attempt to uncover the channels
through which openness affects economic growth.  Wacziarg’s index of trade policy is a linear
combination of three indicators: (a) the average import duty rate; (b) the NTB coverage ratio;
and (c) the Sachs-Warner indicator.
73  The weights used to construct the combined index come
from a regression of trade volumes (as a share of GDP) on these three indicators plus some other
determinants.  Using a panel made up of five-year averages for 57 countries during 1970-89,
Wacziarg finds that investment is the most important channel through which openness increases
growth, accounting for more than sixty percent of the total effect.
We have two worries about this paper.  First, we are not sure that the regularities revealed
by the data over time horizons of five years or less are particularly informative about the
relationship between trade policy and long-run economic performance.  It would be interesting to
see if the results hold up with averages constructed over a decade or more.  Second, as discussed
                                               
70 Since Summers-Heston data are not available for the 1990s, we used World Bank data on GDP per capita (at
constant prices).
71 Harrison (1996) cites disappointing results with cross-section regressions as a motivation for going the panel
route.
72 Indeed, when Harrison (1996) controls for some business-cycle conditions, about half of her significant
coefficients (on openness-related variables) disappear.  The empirical evidence on the short-run relationship
between trade liberalization and economic growth is judiciously reviewed in Greenaway et al. (1998), who point to
both positive and negative findings.  These authors attempt to trace out the dynamics of the output response using
three different indicators of policy (including the Sachs-Warner index), and report finding a J-curve effect: output
first falls and then increases.
73 More specifically, Wacziarg uses the timing of trade liberalizations in Sachs and Warner (1995) to assign a value
to each country for any given five-year period.38
previously, we are skeptical that the Sachs-Warner measure, on which the Wacziarg indicator is
partly based, is a meaningful indicator of trade policy. Wacziarg remarks in a footnote (1998, fn.
9) that the “exclusion of [the Sachs-Warner indicator] from the trade policy index reduced the
precision of the estimates … but did not change the qualitative nature of the results.”  We would
have preferred to see estimates based only on tariff and NTB indicators.
VIII.  Concluding remarks
We have scrutinized in this paper some of the more prominent recent empirical studies on
the relationship between trade barriers and economic growth.  While we do not pretend to have
undertaken an exhaustive survey, we believe that the weaknesses we have identified are endemic
to this literature.  Still, in view of the voluminous research on the subject, a natural question that
arises is whether we shouldn’t take comfort from the fact that so many authors, using varying
methods, have all arrived at the same conclusion?
74  Don’t we learn something from the
cumulative evidence, even if individual papers have shortcomings?
We take a different message from this large literature.  Had the negative relationship
between trade restrictions and economic growth been convincingly demonstrated, we doubt that
this issue would continue to generate so much empirical research.  We interpret the persistent
interest in this area as reflecting the worry that the existing approaches haven’t gotten it “quite
right.”  One indication of this is that the newer papers are habitually motivated by exegeses on
the methodological shortcomings of prior work.
We are especially struck and puzzled by the proliferation of indices of trade restrictions.
It is common to assert in this literature that simple trade-weighted tariff averages or non-tariff
coverage ratios—which we believe to be the most direct indicators of trade restrictions—are
misleading as indicators of the stance of trade policy.  Yet we know of no papers that document
the existence of serious biases in these direct indicators, much less establish that an alternative
indicator “performs” better (in the relevant sense of calibrating the restrictiveness of trade
regimes).
75  An examination of simple averages of taxes on imports and exports and NTB
coverage ratios leaves us with the impression that these measures in fact do a decent job of rank-
ordering countries according to the restrictiveness of their trade regimes.  We provide in Table
VIII.1 a simple measure of import duties for a large sample of countries and three different
periods, so that the reader can form his/her judgement on this.
As we mentioned in the introduction, we are skeptical that there is a strong negative
relationship in the data between trade barriers and economic growth, at least for levels of trade
                                               
74 As T.N. Srinivasan (1997, 34), a critic of the methods and data used in this literature notes:  "Nonetheless, the fact
that a number of studies using different data sets, countries and methodologies happened to arrive at similar
conclusions [on the relationship between openness and growth] that are also consistent with a priori reasoning,
suggests that they deserve serious consideration, with due allowances being made for their conceptual and statistical
deficiencies."
75 Pritchett (1996) comes closest.  The point of his paper, however, is to document the weak correlation between
commonly used indicators of trade restrictions, and not to argue for the superiority of one indicator over the others.39
restrictions observed in practice.  We view the search for such a relationship as futile.  We think
there are two other fruitful avenues for future research.
First, in cross-national work, it might be productive to look for contingent relationships
between trade policy and growth.  Do trade restrictions operate differently in low- versus high-
income countries?  In small versus large countries?  In countries with a comparative advantage in
primary products versus those with comparative advantage in manufactured goods?  In periods
of rapid expansion of world trade versus periods of stagnant trade?  Further, it would help to
disaggregate policies and to distinguish the possibly dissimilar effects of different types of trade
policies (or of combinations thereof).  Are tariff and non-tariff barriers to imports of capital
goods more harmful to growth than other types of trade restrictions?  Does the provision of duty-
free access to imported inputs for exporters stimulate growth?  Are export-processing zones good
for growth?  Does the variation in tariff rates (or NTBs) across sectors matter?  The cross-
national work has yet to provide answers to such questions.
 
Second, we think there is much to be learned from micro-econometric analysis of plant-
level data sets.  These data sets constitute a rich source for uncovering the ways in which trade
policy influences production, employment and technological performance of firms (see Roberts
and Tybout 1996).  Recent research by Bernard and Jensen (1995, 1998), Aw, Chung, and
Roberts (1998), and Clerides, Lach and Tybout (forthcoming) has already shed new light on the
relationship between trade and firm performance.  For example, these papers (based on the
experiences of countries as diverse as the United States, Taiwan, and Mexico) find little evidence
that firms derive technological or other benefits from exporting per se; the more common pattern
is that efficient producers tend to self-select into export markets.  In other words, causality seems
to go from productivity to exports, not vice versa.  Relating these analyses to trade policies is the
obvious next step in this line of research.
Let us close by restating our objective in this paper.  We do not want to leave the reader
with the impression that we think trade protection is good for economic growth.  We know of no
credible evidence--at least for the post-1945 period--that suggests that trade restrictions are
systematically associated with higher growth rates.  On the other hand, we believe that there has
been a tendency in academic and policy discussions to greatly overstate the systematic evidence
in favor of trade openness.  We view this paper as a corrective to this tendency.  What we would
like the reader to take away from this paper is some caution and humility in interpreting the
existing cross-national evidence on the relationship between trade policy and economic growth.
What we believe we have shown is that the challenge of identifying the connections between
trade policy and economic growth is one that still remains before us.40
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Series U211.Table III.1 Effect of geographical and exchange-rate policy variables on Dollar's index
























Notes:  Heteroskedasticity-corrected t-statistics in parentheses.  See appendix for variable definitions.
Regressions include a constant term and cover only developing countries.  Levels of statistical significance
indicated by asterisks:* 99 percent; ** 95 percent; *** 90 percent.Table III.2: Replication and extension of Dollar's (1992) results
Dependent variable: growth of real GDP per capita,
1976-85
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DISTORTION -0.018* -0.008 -0.003 -0.004 -0.008
(-3.128) (-1.009) (-0.406) (-0.514) (-0.899)
VARIABILITY -0.080* -0.080** -0.103* -0.107* -0.099*
(-2.64) (-2.084) (-3.3) (-3.51) (-3.212)
Investment/GDP 0.137* 0.100**
(3.515) (2.278)
Latin America -0.015** -0.016* -0.014** -0.019*
(-2.34) (-2.65) (-2.362) (-3.337)
East Asia 0.007 0.010 0.011 0.004
(0.747) (0.937) (0.976) (0.382)
SSA -0.018** -0.026* -0.029* -0.028*
(-2.419) (-3.824) (-4.129) (-3.411)




N 95 95 95 95 80
R
2 0.38 0.45 0.40 0.41 0.49
Notes:  Heteroskedasticity-corrected t-statistics in parentheses.  Regressions include a constant term and
cover only developing countries.  Levels of statistical significance indicated by asterisks:* 99 percent; ** 95
percent; *** 90 percent.Table III.3: Dollar (1992) regressions using Summers-Heston version 5.6 data
Dependent variable: growth of real GDP per capita, 1976-85
largest sample Dollar sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
DISTORTION 0.000 -0.011*** -0.003 -0.010 0.000 -0.015* -0.007 -0.012***
(0.029) (-1.951) (-0.453) (-1.664) (0.093) (-2.829) (-1.267) (-1.951)
VARIABILITY -0.053** -0.081* -0.075* -0.101* -0.063** -0.092* -0.081* -0.092*
(-2.302) (-3.376) (-2.809) (-4.105) (-2.615) (-3.865) (-2.857) (-3.779)
Investment/GDP 0.081* 0.08** 0.061 0.055
(2.659) (2.633) (1.606) (1.518)
dummy for Ghana 0.08* 0.044*** 0.085*** 0.099* 0.065* 0.086*
  and Uganda (3.199) (1.691) (3.772) (4.108) (2.707) (3.838)
Latin America -0.017* -0.016*** -0.018* -0.021*
(-2.832) (-2.895) (-2.822) (-3.803)
East Asia 0.008 0.006 0.007 0.001
(0.927) (0.653) (0.83) (0.17)
SSA -0.019* -0.022*** -0.02* -0.023*
(-3.135) (-3.993) (-3.302) (-4.116)
log initial income -0.01** -0.012*
(-2.625) (-3.065)
schooling, 1975 0.002 0.004*
(1.408) (2.600)
N 112 112 112 84 95 95 95 80
R
2 0.1575 0.2035 0.2611 0.4644 0.159 0.2374 0.3462 0.4892
Notes:  Heteroskedasticity-corrected t-statistics in parentheses.  Regressions
include a constant term and cover only developing countries.  Levels








See appendix for variable definitionsTable IV.2 Effect of Different Openness Indicators on Growth
Dependent variable:growth of GDP per capita, 1970-89
































2 .593 .637 0.522 0.455 0.617 .522 .619
N 79 71 78 75 74 74 74
All Equations except column 6 include the following controls: Log of GDP in 1970, investment rate, 1970, government
consumption/GDP, assassinations per capita, deviation from world investment prices, secondary schooling ratio, primary
schooling ratio, revolutions and coups, and a constant term.  Column 6 drops the investment rate and deviation from
world investment prices.  Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics based on Huber-White heteroskedasticity-consistent
standard errors.Table IV.3: Alternative Partitions of Openness Index
Regression Openness Index (Three
Variables)






























































The label for each index denotes the openness indicators used to construct that index.  M=State Monopoly of Main Export, S=Socialist Economic System, Q=Non-Tariff Barriers,
T=Tariffs, B=Black Market Premium.  For example SMQT is set to 0 if it is closed according to either of the criteria for S,M, Q or T, and to 1 otherwise.  All results are for
regressions which control for log of GDP in 1970, investment rate, 1970, government consumption/ GDP, assassinations per capita, deviation from world investment prices,
secondary schooling ratio, primary schooling ratio, revolutions and coups and a constant term.  Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics based on Huber-White heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors.Table IV.4: Correlations of Black Market Premium with Macroeconomic and Political Disequilibrium Variables
Variable Correlation
Inflation 1975-1990  0.427
Debt/Exports, 1985  0.333
Change in Terms of Trade -0.064
War  0.230
Quality of Institutions -0.473Table IV.5: Threshold Effects in Black Market Premium
Dependent Variable:















N 80 80Table IV.6: Effect of Black Market Premium on Growth Before and After Controlling for Measures of
Macroeconomic and Political Disequilibrium
Dependent Variable: Growth of GDP per capita, 1970-89
















































2 0.476 .382 .589 .496 .507 .567 .703
N 80 76 54 77 80 75 46
All Equations include the following controls: log of GDP in 1970, investment rate, 1970, government consumption/GDP,
assassinations per capita, deviation from world investment prices, secondary schooling ratio, primary schooling ratio,
revolutions and coups and a constant term.  Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics based on Huber-White
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors.Table IV.7: Sensitivity of Openness Result to Macroeconomic and Political Disequilibrium Dummy and Quality of
Institutions
Dependent Variable: Growth of GDP per capita, 1970-89









































Dummies No No No Yes Yes Yes
R
2 .593 .672 .662 .733 .736 .794
N 79 70 70 70 74 69
All Equations include the following controls: log of GDP in 1970, investment rate, 1970, government consumption/GDP,
assassinations per capita, deviation from world investment prices, secondary schooling ratio, primary schooling ratio,
revolutions and coups, and a constant term.  Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics based on Huber-White
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors.  In equations 3 and 4 openness is set to 0 for Mauritius and Indonesia.
DISEQ (political and macroeconomic disequilibrium dummy) equals 1 unless: country is in Africa, terms of trade fell by
more than 20 %, debt/GNP ratio greater than 125%, inflation greater than 10%, or country was involved in war.TableV.1: Least Squares Regressions














































































Notes:  These are the estimated coefficients from regressions where each of the trade policy indicators is entered
separately.  Each equation also includes log GDP per capita in 1965 and schooling in 1965 as regressors (as in the
original Edwards [1998] specification).  t-statistics are in parentheses (based on heteroskedasticity-consistent standard
errors in column 3.)TableV.2: Instrumental Variables
Dependent Variable: TFP Growth, 1980-90
(1) (2) (3)





























































Notes:  Same as previous table. TableV.3: Property Rights, Openness and Growth
Dependent Variable: TFP Growth, 1980-90
(1) (2) (3) (4)












Test of Overidentifying Restrictions 29.3244 5.4072
p-value 6.72E-06 0.2480
Notes:   Each equation also includes log GDP per capita in 1965 and schooling in 1965 as regressors. T-statistics based on
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses.TableV.4: Robustness of Trade Taxes and Heritage Index Results
Dependent Variable: TFP Growth, 1980-90
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Collected Taxes Ratio (Edwards) -0.2676
(-2.25)**
Average Duty (World Bank) 0.0225
(1.01)












Number of Observations 45 43 43 66 58 67
Notes: Each equation also includes log GDP per capita in 1965 and schooling in 1965 as regressors. t-statistics based on
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses.Table VI.1: Average Growth Rates
Growth Rate Belgium France Germany Italy Netherlands Average
1900-1913 0.009 0.015 0.015 0.028 0.009 0.014
1921-1938 0.010 0.022 0.026 0.016 0.010 0.017
1949-1960 0.026 0.038 0.077 0.054 0.031 0.044
1960-1975 0.039 0.037 0.029 0.040 0.032 0.035
1975-1994 0.018 0.017 0.020 0.023 0.014 0.018Table VI.2: Contributions to variance around EC Mean
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990
EC6 0.036977 0.019967 0.010036 0.006338 0.007037
EFTA6 0.068853 0.05347 0.036313 0.015968 0.010965
Others 0.08851 0.081835 0.056439 0.047611 0.034028
Variance 0.19434 0.155272 0.102788 0.069918 0.05203Table VIII.1: Import duties as percent of imports (averages for
various years)
1974-75 1984-85 1994-95
Albania n.a. n.a. 10.03
Argentina n.a. 13.85 8.47
Australia 9.80 8.56 4.58
Austria 4.17 1.60 1.04
Bahamas, The 19.63 24.38 n.a.
Bahrain 2.12 4.07 3.62
Bangladesh 11.40 14.53 n.a.
Barbados 9.38 7.80 n.a.
Belize n.a. 20.31 29.74
Benin 18.81 n.a. n.a.
Bhutan n.a. 0.18 0.60
Bolivia n.a. 9.93 5.10
Botswana 22.95 18.11 18.35
Brazil n.a. 6.23 n.a.
Bulgaria n.a. n.a. 5.66
Burkina Faso 18.70 13.64 n.a.
Burundi n.a. 16.72 12.95
Cameroon 24.84 22.80 16.04
Canada 5.56 3.92 1.73
China n.a. n.a. 3.25
Colombia 12.40 13.64 8.70
Comoros n.a. 25.59 n.a.
Congo, Dem. Rep. 19.23 13.88 9.27
Congo, Rep. 13.30 n.a. n.a.
Costa Rica 6.57 10.04 9.16
Cote d'Ivoire n.a. 31.10 n.a.
Croatia n.a. n.a. 10.57
Cyprus 8.22 9.67 n.a.
Czech Republic n.a. n.a. 4.04
Denmark 0.79 0.09 0.08
Dominican Republic 23.81 18.83 26.85
Ecuador 15.65 21.24 8.28
Egypt, Arab Rep. 27.84 28.30 20.30
El Salvador 6.94 6.54 6.27
Estonia n.a. n.a. 0.54
Ethiopia 28.08 13.97 n.a.
Fiji 14.93 20.50 15.24
Finland 2.92 1.27 0.74
France 0.09 0.07 0.02
Gabon 23.85 25.57 n.a.
Gambia, The n.a. 29.41 n.a.
Germany 0.18 0.02 n.a.
Ghana 13.77 15.88 n.a.
Guatemala 9.27 7.15 8.71
Guinea-Bissau n.a. 0.02 n.a.Honduras 8.33 n.a. n.a.
Hungary n.a. 6.82 n.a.
Iceland n.a. 13.78 1.79
India 29.27 41.92 26.09
Indonesia 8.04 3.87 4.03
Iran, Islamic Rep. 11.38 25.01 5.28
Ireland 10.01 5.96 3.90
Israel 16.96 5.20 n.a.
Italy 0.28 0.05 0.02
Jamaica 7.41 3.76 n.a.
Japan n.a. 2.35 n.a.
Jordan 11.81 14.39 14.65
Kenya 12.97 14.75 14.25
Korea, Rep. 5.56 8.59 4.57
Kuwait 3.96 3.50 3.43
Latvia n.a. n.a. 2.41
Lebanon n.a. n.a. 9.84
Lesotho 13.86 23.03 n.a.
Liberia 11.14 21.00 n.a.
Lithuania n.a. n.a. 2.42
Madagascar n.a. n.a. 20.57
Malawi 8.69 16.26 n.a.
Malaysia 9.44 8.68 3.42
Maldives n.a. 12.04 14.91
Mali 13.02 6.38 n.a.
Malta 10.63 10.18 n.a.
Mauritania 11.61 n.a. n.a.
Mauritius 10.23 19.79 16.45
Mexico 13.23 7.99 5.07
Mongolia n.a. n.a. 4.65
Morocco 13.92 13.27 n.a.
Myanmar 28.23 25.32 45.71
Nepal 17.25 12.44 9.64
Netherlands Antilles 0.74 1.43 n.a.
New Zealand 5.19 5.46 3.83
Nicaragua 6.70 8.06 11.66
Nigeria 19.70 14.52 n.a.
Norway 1.25 0.76 1.03
Oman 0.68 3.70 n.a.
Pakistan 16.98 24.45 26.99
Panama n.a. n.a. 8.73
Papua New Guinea 7.72 11.74 16.03
Paraguay 11.97 6.37 n.a.
Peru 15.42 26.10 13.02
Philippines 17.37 14.28 14.18
Poland n.a. 8.79 16.83
Portugal 10.16 2.79 0.01
Romania n.a. n.a. 5.99
Russian Federation n.a. n.a. 2.82
Samoa n.a. 29.51 n.a.Senegal 17.01 22.27 n.a.
Seychelles n.a. 29.52 64.86
Sierra Leone 20.07 15.85 27.62
Singapore 1.26 0.82 n.a.
Solomon Islands 10.66 19.58 n.a.
Somalia 27.84 n.a. n.a.
South Africa 4.22 3.37 1.79
Spain 13.04 6.52 0.01
Sri Lanka 6.81 15.82 9.38
St. Kitts and Nevis n.a. 17.56 n.a.
St. Lucia n.a. 13.49 n.a.
St. Vincent and the Grenadines n.a. 15.29 25.39
Sudan 31.12 n.a. n.a.
Suriname 17.81 16.27 n.a.
Swaziland 21.02 23.14 n.a.
Sweden 2.09 0.79 1.11
Switzerland n.a. 3.66 5.00
Syrian Arab Republic 14.45 n.a. n.a.
Tanzania 10.83 9.76 n.a.
Thailand 14.74 13.74 8.27
Togo n.a. 16.71 n.a.
Trinidad and Tobago n.a. n.a. 6.68
Tunisia 20.51 26.47 20.26
Turkey 21.18 6.25 3.38
Uganda 12.99 6.15 n.a.
United Kingdom 1.19 0.01 0.10
United States 3.85 3.53 2.81
Uruguay 7.11 13.50 6.71
Vanuatu n.a. 25.56 n.a.
Venezuela 7.63 9.80 10.08
Yemen, Rep. n.a. n.a. 29.91
Zambia 6.78 8.20 15.52
Zimbabwe n.a. 22.89 n.a.
Source:  World Bank, World Development Indicators 1998.
Notes:  Countries listed are those for which there is data for at least









































































































INDFigure I.2: Partial Association between Growth and Non-Tariff Barriers
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PhilipHondurFigure IV.2: Partial Association between Growth and SQT




















































































































































































































1818-1833: Progressive liberalization of 
German Trade Restrictions culminating in 
creation of Zollverein.
1862-65: France signs 
free trade treaties with 
Belgium, Prussia, Italy
and Netherlands
1879-1901: Tariffs raised in
Germany(79,02), France (81,92)
and Italy (78,87)
1914-25: European Trade breaks down
during World War I and its aftermath, .
1930-38: Widespread imposistion 
of import controls as response to 
Depresion
1957: Creation of EEC
1962-68: Final Elimination































































































































































































































World BankFigure VI.7: Ratio of US to European GDP and Import Duties, 1820-1938
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